

Authority *AMWAK 11*  
By *A* NARA Date *3/21/88*

Classification)  
AT CH

*745w.00/12-854*

FROM

USLO KHARTOUM

DESP. NO.  
100

TO

THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON

December 8, 1954

REF

1954-12-8, *Abdour Hamza, Independent*  
Khartoum's Despatch 99; Cairo's Despatch 99; November 23, 1954

58 For Dept. Use Only	ACTION	DEPT.	FILE NO.
	<i>NEA-4</i>	<i>EUR-5</i>	<i>04-6 10-4 P-1 R-9/55-2 SP-1</i>
	REC'D	OTHER	
	<i>1-3</i>		<i>8-10-55-1</i>

SUBJECT: Mirghani Hamza and the Khatmia Plans for an Independent Sudan

*CA-2681 745w.00/10-2254*

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Sayed Mirghani Hamza, the acknowledged political leader of the Khatmia, stated bluntly and forcefully to me that he and the Khatmia stand for the complete independence of the Sudan. This does not mean an unwillingness to cooperate with Egypt, but such cooperation will only be possible if it is between equals. He is not able to state this point of view publicly at this time because he and the other Khatmia leaders are trying to bring the Ashigga leaders over to their point of view. Mirghani Hamza does not want to split the NUP during the transitional period. Although he is aware that if he came out personally for complete independence he could count on almost unanimous Southern support and an overwhelming vote of agreement from the Umma members of Parliament, he does not want to do this at this time because he feels an allegiance to the NUP which won the elections by cooperation between its different wings and he has an ingrained distrust of the Umma. In short, he believes the political development of the country would be more stable and orderly if the NUP stayed in power during the time of transition than if new alignments were made at this time. However, and he stated this with considerable force, and so far as I am concerned with conviction, if the Khatmia leaders are unable to bring the Ashigga along with them then they will have no alternative but to split. In such a split he is convinced the Khatmia would triumph and form a Government.

Mirghani Hamza carefully explained that in the foregoing views he believed he had the support of Sayed Ali El Mirghani (SAM) the leader of the Khatmia sect, and he had made these views known to Gamal Abdel Nasser and Salah Salem. When pressed as to what he meant by SAM's support he again took refuge in the phrase that he knew SAM's mind. Since SAM has a genius for being all things to all people, this is not as convincing a view as it might be. When the universal view of SAM as a difficult man to understand was stated, Mirghani Hamza explained that once in a conversation with Salah Salem SAM stated that in every case the son wanted to grow strong and leave its father's control. This to him was conclusive proof of where SAM stood on the future of the Sudan.

In talking about the current situation in Egypt Mirghani Hamza came out strongly for Neguib and insisted that Neguib was not involved in the Muslim Brotherhood plot but that Nasser and his group were afraid of Neguib and had to get rid of him. He explained to Nasser that the Sudanese did not stand for

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