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FROM : AMEMBASSY SANAA

DATE: November 7, 1973

SUBJECT : Conversation with Central Planning Organization
Director Dr. Abdul-Karim al-Iryani

REF : **1973-11-7, IRYANI, IRYANI, US**

1. SUMMARY: President Iryani's principal confidant states YARG remains bitter over US resupply of arms to Israel but understands necessity for US point of view. Yemen remains determined prevent lasting damage to its good relations with USG but fears a resumption of war would make this harder than during first phase. Internally, President Iryani maneuvering for return of former Primin al-Ayni but facing formidable obstacles that make this unlikely. Yemeni military leaders submerge differences to oppose extremist options of right or left. FonMin Nu'man probably to be replaced by Economics Minister Asnag.

2. I called on Central Planning Organization Director Dr. Abdul-Karim al-Iryani November 6 at my request. Dr. Iryani, who is the nephew of President Iryani, has been designated by the latter as a confidential channel for communication between the President and the American Ambassador. Since Dr. Iryani is already the busiest official in the Yemen Government, this is a channel which neither he nor we wish to overuse. However, with the situation in the Middle East poised either between war and peace, or war and a resumption of war, and since most of the Embassy's regular contacts had been absent from Sanaa for some time because of Ramadan and the following Id al-Fitr religious holiday

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2

(October 26-28), I felt it opportune to see him. This was with the object of conveying to President Iryani an awareness of what the United States is trying to accomplish in terms of a Middle East settlement, and to seek reliable information on the Yemeni President's intentions regarding a rumored reorganization of government. Past experience has shown Dr. Iryani to be not only highly intelligent but absolutely reliable and dispassionate as a communications channel.

3. Arab-Israeli War:

I remarked that the dizzying pace of recent diplomatic developments should prove to our Yemeni and other Arab friends that the United States' position has not been hostile to the Arab side. At the outset, we favored a cease-fire with a restoration of the territorial status quo ante in the considered belief that by the time this was accepted it would be Israeli forces that would have to do the pulling back. In their feelings of triumph at the time, the Arabs chose to construe this as a hostile stand. Some of our European friends were too anxious to ingratiate themselves with the Arab side to support the US lead. Only when the tide of battle had clearly turned were the Russians and Arabs willing to accept a cease-fire. It was accepted by the Arabs just in time to avoid yet another major military humiliation, but not in time to prevent the Israelis moving forward immediately after October 22 to take more territory which the Arabs would now be glad to recover.

I said I knew the Yemenis were resentful over the United States' resupply of Israel. Personally, I did not honestly feel this could have had significant impact on the course of battle before the cease-fire. The Israelis had been hurt but they had already turned the tide and would almost certainly have handed the Arabs another defeat even without the resupply, had it not been for the US-supported cease-fire. In any event, when Russia embarked on a massive airlift, the crisis was moved into a different dimension compelling the US to respond. At a latter stage, the same had been true when the Russians threatened unilateral intervention and the US reacted with its military alert to warn them off. In his visits to Middle East capitals Secretary Kissinger's first objective

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