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Authority NND 969049

By CM NARA Date 6-12-03

x.r. POL US-YEMEN

of State

TELEGRAM

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SECRET 223

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ACTION SS-25

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FM AMEMBASSY JIDDA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1569
INFO USINT SANAA

1972-03-30, Iryani, Prince Fahd

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S E C R E T JIDDA 1050

EXDIS

*POL US-YEMEN
for AID CUSHINGHAM*

SUBJECT: PRINCE FAHD IS RETICENT ON SUBJECT OF YEMEN

REF: STATE 48285; JIDDA 999

1. WITH HOPE OF OPENING DISCUSSION ON YEMEN WHICH MIGHT CAST LIGHT ON SAUDI ATTITUDES CONCERNING SITUATION THERE, I TOLD PRINCE FAHD MARCH 28 IN RIYADH I WAS AWARE OF INCREASING INTEREST AND SOME TENSION REGARDING RELATIONS BETWEEN NORTH AND SOUTH YEMEN AND THAT I WANTED TAKE OPPORTUNITY REAFFIRM TO HIM OVERALL US POLICY IN THIS REGION PARTICULARLY WITH REGARD TO YAR. US IS WELL AWARE THREAT POSED BY EXISTENCE REGIME IN PDYR WHICH UNDER HEAVY COMMUNIST INFLUENCE AND FACT THIS REPRESENTS DISTURBING BASE FOR POSSIBLE SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES ON ARABIAN PENINSULA. WE HAVE, HOWEVER, SOUGHT CONCENTRATE OUR THOUGHTS ON LONG-RANGE PROBLEM AND POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS THEREFOR. ACCORDINGLY WE BELIEVE US ROLE IS BEST ONE OF CONTRIBUTING AS WE CAN TO ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT OF WAR-DEVASTATED YEMEN. WE WERE GRATEFUL FOR CONSISTENT SAUDI EFFORTS ENCOURAGE YAR RE-ESTABLISH RELATIONS WITH US AND I WAS NOT AT THIS TIME ASKING FOR FURTHER SAUDI ENDEAVORS IN THAT DIRECTION. IF TIME CAME WHEN YEMENIS RE-ESTABLISHED TIES WITH US, WE PREPARED, AS I HAD PREVIOUSLY INDICATED TO PRINCE, DO WHAT WE COULD AND IN SOME ENDEAVORS, WE WOULD HOPE BE ABLE COOPERATE WITH SAUDI ARABIA TOWARD HELPING YAR PROGRESS.

2. PRINCE FAHD REPLIED THAT INTENTION OF AIDING YEMEN

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ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT WAS VITAL ELEMENT ALSO IN SAUDI POLICY FOR
 STRENGTHENING REGIME IN NORTH.

3. IN EFFORT DRAW FAHD INTO FURTHER EXPLANATION HIS VIEWS,
 I ASKED IF HE HAD ANY REFLECTIONS OF REPORTS OF TENSION
 WHICH MIGHT LEAD TO MILITARY ACTION BETWEEN NORTH AND
 SOUTH YEMEN. FAHD REPLIED COURTEOUSLY THAT SAUDI GOVERN-
 MENT AWARE OF BORDER DISTURBANCE BUT HAD NO RECENT INFOR-
 MATION.

4. COMMENT: JUST PRIOR MY OPENING TOPIC OF YEMEN WITH
 FAHD, WE HAD ENGAGED IN DETAILED DISCUSSION OF GULF POLI-
 TICAL SITUATION IN WHICH PRICE HAD CITED INTELLIGENCE
 REPORTS RECEIVED AS TO BAHRAIN KUWAIT ATTITUDES ETC.
 NEVERTHELESS FAHD MAY HAVE FELT MY UTILIZATION OF AID/OPS
 AMERICAN CITIZEN INTERPRETER WOULD REVEAL TO THIRD PARTY
 INFORMATION HE CONSIDERED EXTREMELY SENSITIVE. HE MAY
 HAVE ALSO FELT, LIKE PRINCE SULTAN (REFTEL) HE DID NOT
 WISH SPEAK OFF CUFF ON THIS TOPIC. IN ANY CASE, FUR-
 THER DISCUSSION ON MATTER WHICH SULTAN HAS PROMISED
 SOULD PROVIDE FULLER UNDERSTANDING SAUDI ATTITUDES.

GP-3
 THACHER

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