

CLASSIFICATION BY NARA DATE 3/27/84 ATCH

745W.00/7954

FROM : USLO, Khartoum

TO : THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON.

DATE July 9, 1954

REF : London despatches Nos. 3975, June 8, and 4076, June 18, 1954

| | | |
|-----------------------------|-----------------|----------------------------|
| 76 For Dept. Use Only | ACTION NEA-4 | DEPT. I IN F O |
| | REC'D 7-26 | OTHER CIA-7 |

| | | |
|----------------|--------|---|
| 17 JUL 1954 | UN A-4 | 2 |
| MESSAGE CENTER | NEA | |

This Document Must Be Returned To DC/R

SUBJECT:

1954-76/Abdohani, Mohamed, Britain

Conversations between Foreign Office and President of Umma Party W.H. Luce, Adviser to the Governor General on Constitutional and External Affairs, informed me in confidence that he had received a transcript of the recent London conversations between Sayed Siddik, President of the Umma Party, and the Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, Selwyn Lloyd. He gave me the gist of these conversations which was identical with that contained in London despatch 4076. Luce emphasized that the Minister of State had been forceful with Siddik in pointing out that the British Government had no intention at this time of denouncing the Anglo-Egyptian Agreement on the Sudan of February 1953, on the grounds that it had been flagrantly violated by the Egyptians, as Siddik urged. Furthermore, Lloyd pointed out that since the British Government did not intend to denounce this agreement it had no intention of bringing together an international commission to supervise the transition of the Sudanese people to independence

745W.00/7-954

Luce then went on to explain that he understood that Sayed Abdel Rahman El Mahdi had sent Siddik, his son, a letter ordering him to go to the Foreign Office and make the above proposal (Siddik went to the United Kingdom primarily to discuss the disposal of SAR's large cotton crop). SAR has long believed that the Anglo-Egyptian Agreement on the Sudan should be denounced by the British because of alleged Egyptian violations and that the British should then supervise or have an international commission supervise the transition to independence. He ordered Siddik to urge the British to carry out this proposal. In Luce's opinion neither Siddik nor Ibrahim Ahmed, SAR's chief political adviser who accompanied Siddik to London really believed the British Government should or would proceed along the lines that SAR suggested. They both acted on orders but their hearts were not in their orders. This view is somewhat at variance with what both Siddik and Ibrahim Ahmed have told the reporting officer, as they gave me to understand that they believed Britain should denounce the Anglo-Egyptian Agreement.

Thus far no word of the substance of Siddik's conversations has leaked into the local Arabic press. There have been reports of his visit but these have been interpreted as merely a courtesy call on Siddik's part. The blunt rejection by the Foreign Office of SAR's request for a British denunciation of the Anglo-Egyptian Agreement, coming at the same time as

the

CONFIDENTIAL

ACTION COPY - DEPARTMENT OF STATE

LWC

J. Sweeney /at REPORTER

17 JUL 1954

The action office must return this permanent record copy to DC/R files with an endorsement of action taken.

Confidential File

the recent severe sentences of some of the Ansar leaders for participation in the March 1 riots, has led to a marked despondency on the part of SAR. He has gone out of his way to warn his followers that there is to be no trouble until the sentences against the Ansar leaders have been appealed. The implication of this warning has been that if the death sentence is not commuted on one particular Ansar leader that there will be trouble.

British officials are not concerned about this possibility as they have come to the conclusion, in Luce's words, that "SAR has had it." Luce and his associates do not believe SAR will act, although Luce qualified this by saying he did not believe SAR would start a civil war as long as the British were in the Sudan because he realizes the British would use their troops to put down a civil war. However, close friends of SAR within the past few days say that once again SAR has been talking about the desirability of civil war. There is no evidence of preparation for immediate trouble; furthermore, this is the cultivation season over much of the Western Sudan and it would be inconvenient for SAR to raise his followers at this particular time.

cc: Cairo
London

Joseph Sweeney
United States Liaison Officer

CONFIDENTIAL