



Authority **NND 969049**
By **CM** NARA Date **6-12-03**

t of State

TELEGRAM

Y Pol Yemen - Yemen

SECRET 594

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ACTION NEA-12

1972-12-18, Iryani, ~~Pol~~ Ayni, Resignation

INFO OCT-01 EUR-20 PASS-00 PM-08 NSC-10 SS-14 RSC-01

CIAE-00 INR-09 NSAE-00 CODE-00 PRS-01 (RSR-01) 2077 W
035054

P R 180736Z DEC 72
FM AMEMBASSY SANAA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1552 PRIORITY
INFO AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY TEHRAN

S E C R E T SANAA 1132 SECTION ONE OF TWO

DEPT PASS AS INFO ADDEE TO CINCEUR FOR POLAD

SUBJ: YAR: RESIGNATION OF PRIMIN AL-AYNI

REF: SANAA 1112

Pol 15-1 Yemen
XX Pol Yemen - Yemen

1. SUMMARY: FULLER BACKGROUND ON DEC 15 RESIGNATION OF PRIM MIN/FONMIN AL-AYNI.

2. AS DEPT AWARE FROM POST'S PREVIOUS REPORTING, OPPOSITION TO AL-AYNI'S CONTINUED TENURE AS PRIMIN AND FONMIN HAS BEEN STEADILY BUILDING IN RECENT WEEKS. FROM THE BEGINNING, HE HAS HAD TO COPE WITH POWERFUL PERSONAL ENEMIES AMONG CONSERVATIVE POLITICAL, MILITARY AND TRIBAL ELEMENTS; HOSTILITY FROM MERCHANT LANDLORD CLASS WHICH FEARED THAT HIS BA'ATHI POLITICAL BACKGROUND WOULD LEAD HIM TO ACTIONS ON ADENI NATIONALIZATION MODEL AND A NEGLIGIBLE INTERNAL POWER BASE. HIS STRONGEST SUPPORT HAD COME FROM HIS BROTHER-IN-LAW, HODEIDAH GOVERNOR SHAIKH SINAN ABU LUHUM, ONE OF THE TWO TRIBAL LEADERS WHO EMERGED IN COMMANDING POLITICAL POSITIONS DUE TO THEIR LOYALTY TO REPUBLICAN SIDE DURING 1962-1968 CIVIL WAR (THIS SUPPORT WAS PRIMARILY DUE TO FAMILY TIES AND NOT

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TO SYMPATHY WITH AL-AYNI'S POLICIES. FROM PRESIDENT AL-IRYANI, WHO WAS NOT ALTOGETHER PLEASED WITH HIM BUT PREFERRED HIM TO OTHER POTENTIAL CANDIDATES FROM VARIOUS FRAGMENTED, NON-TRIBAL LEFT WING GROUPS AND IDEOLOGICALLY ORIENTED MODERNISTS, AND FROM OTHER ARAB STATES, EVEN SAUDI ARABIA WAS WILLING FOR A PERIOD TO OVERLOOK AL-AYNI'S BA'ATHI BACKGROUND SINCE HE SEEMED TO BE ONE OF VERY FEW YEMENI LEADERS OF PRIME-MINISTERIAL AND INTERNATIONAL STATURE AFTER THE EXPULSION OF HASSAN AL-AMRY IN SEPT. 1971.

3. IN FACE OF THESE SUPPORTS AND GIVEN ABSENCE OF ANY IMMEDIATELY APPARENT ALTERNATIVE, AL-AYNI'S OPPONENTS WERE FOR LONG COMPELLED TO WAIT FOR HIM TO ACT INCAUTIOUSLY. THEIR FIRST REAL OPPORTUNITY TO FAN LATENT RESENTMENT AGAINST HIM CAME AS RESULT OF HIS SUDDEN ACCEPTANCE OF A CEASE FIRE WITH PDRY IN OCTOBER FOLLOWED SHORTLY THEREAFTER BY OCTOBER 28 CAIRO DECLARATION OF UNITY OF TWO YEMENS. HIS APPARENT EMBRACE OF PDRY COMMUNIST RHETORIC AND HIS FAILURE TO CONSULT WITH POWERFUL CONSERVATIVE FORCES BEFORE LAUNCHING YAR ON THIS COURSE INFURIATED MANY INFLUENTIAL ELEMENTS AND PROVIDED FERTILE GROUND FOR CULTIVATION BY THOSE SEEKING HIS REMOVAL.

4. SEQUENTIALLY, NEXT MOVE WHICH PAVED WAY FOR DECISIVE EFFORT AGAINST AL-AYNI, WAS PRESIDENT AL-IRYANI'S SKILLFUL TAKEOVER OF YAR'S LEADERSHIP IN UNITY INITIATIVE IN TRIPOLI DISCUSSIONS NOVEMBER 26-28. AIDED BY A FEW CAPABLE SUBORDINATES, AMONG THEM YAR'S AMBASSADOR TO FRANCE, MUHAMMAD NU'MAN, AND WITH A STRONG ASSIST FROM LIBYAN PRESIDENT QADHAFI, AL-IRYANI RECAST FORMULATION OF UNITY IN A WAY THAT MADE IT MORE PALATABLE TO CONSERVATIVES. AL-AYNI WAS EFFECTIVELY TRAPPED AND PRACTICALLY WRITTEN OUT OF THE ACT. BY VIRTUE OF AL-IRYANI'S TAKEOVER AND RECASTING, AL-AYNI BECAME DISPENSIBLE, SINCE HIS REMOVAL COULD LESS EASILY BE PORTRAYED BY PDRY AS A YAR BETRAYAL OF UNITY.

5. FINAL FACTOR, ALTHOUGH OF WHAT WENAWG WE CANNOT JUDGE, WAS POLITE BUT FIRM ULTIMATUM FROM KING FAISAL TO PRESIDENT AL-IRYANI THAT PRICE FOR SAG'S WATCHFUL BUT NON-HOSTILE ATTITUDE TOWARD FURTHER UNITY MOVES

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WOULD BE SHIFT IN YAR PRIME MINISTERS. BECAUSE OF YEMENIS NATIONALISTIC PRIDE, THIS ACTUALLY COULD HAVE HAD, AND STILL MIGHT, PRODUCE COUNTER EFFECT OF BOLSTERING AL-AYNI'S POSITION. BUT GIVEN MOUNTING SENTIMENT AGAINST AL-AYNI, AND REALIZATION OF YAR'S DEPENDENCY ON SAG FINANCIAL LARGESSE, WHICH SAUDIS HAD SUGGESTED MIGHT BE CUT OFF IF THEIR WISHES DISREGARDED, IT HAS NOT YET WORKED THAT WAY. ON CONTRARY, AFTER FAISAL'S MESSAGE, SAG WAS INFORMED THAT PRIMIN BEING RECALLED FROM NEW YORK PREPARATORY TO DISMISSAL.

6. RECEIVING HIS RECAL, AL-AYNI CHARACTERISTICALLY SOUGHT TO GAIN TIME AND PLAY HIS CARDS IN THE LARGER WORLD ARENA, ERXG. HIS DIPLOMATIC STOPS IN LONDON AND CAIRO. BUT FOR ONCE DELAYING TACTICS DID NOT WORK. VERY SOON AFTER HIS RETURN TO YEMEN DEC 12 AL-AYNI SEEMS TO HAVE REALIZED THAT HIS OPPOSITION HAD BECOME

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CRAWFORD

NOTE BY OC/T: SANAA 1132 PASSED ABOVE ADDRESSEE.

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ACTION NEA-12

INFO OCT-01 EUR-20 PASS-00 PRS-01 PM-08 NSC-10 SS-14

RSC-01 CIAE-00 INR-09 NSAE-00 DODE-00 RSR-01 2077 W

034980

P R 180736Z DEC 72
 FM AMEMBASSY SANAA
 TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1553 PRIORITY
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S E C R E T SANAA 1132 FINAL SECTION OF TWO

DEPT PASS AS INFO ADDEE TO CINCEUR FOR POLAD

SURJ: YAR: RESIGNATION OF PRIMIN AL-AYNI

TOO STRONG TO OUTMANEUVER, AT LEAST IN SHORT TERM.

7. EMBASSY FIRST LEARNED THAT AL-AYNI HAD SUBMITTED RESIGNATION DEC 15 FROM CALL ON MEISAME EVENING BY MUHAMMAD NU'MAN (PROTECT). ACCORDING HIS OWN (PARTISAN) VERSION, SUPPORTED BY AS YET LIMITED HARD COLLATERAL INFORMATION, NU'MAN PLAYED A LARGE ROLE IN ORCHESTRATING COALESCENCE OF OPPOSITION TO AL-AYNI FOLLOWING HIS RETURN FROM RIYADH DEC 7. BY DEC 13 HE AND OTHERS WERE ABLE PRESENT PRESIDENT AL-IRYANI WITH A CONSENSUS IN FAVOR OF AL-AYNI'S "RESIGNATION" WHICH INCLUDED CONSULTATIVE ASSEMBLY PRESIDENT SHAIKH ABDULLAH AL-ANABY, ARMY DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF AL-MASWARI, PRESIDENTIAL COUNCIL MEMBERS ABDULLAH AL-HIJRI AND MUHAMMAD ALI UTHMAN, AND PERHAPS MOST CRITICAL OF ALL, SINAN ABU LUDDOH (ABU LUHUM, IT APPEARS, HAD BEEN BROUGHT AROUND TO VIEW THAT IT WOULD BE PREFERABLE FOR HIS BROTHER-IN-LAW TO SAVE HIMSELF FOR ANOTHER DAY BY RESIGNING GRACEFULLY RATHER THAN BE OPENLY DISMISSED,

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AND EVIDENTLY SO COUNSELED HIM UPON HIS RETURN TO HOEIDAH,)
WITH THIS STRONG ARRAY AGAINST AL-AYNI, AL-IRYANI, WHOSE
STYLE OF GOVERNING IS GENERALLY ALOOF AND NON-PARTISAN,
IS SAID BY NU'MAN TO HAVE AGREED THAT PRIME MINISTER SHOULD
BE INVITED TO RESIGN.

8. ARGUMENT RE MODALITY OF AL-AYNI'S RESIGNATION CENTERED,
ACCORDING TO NU'MAN, ON WHETHER THIS SHOULD BE PUBLIC OR
PRIVATE AND WHETHER HE SHOULD LEAVE COUNTRY. IN THE END,
AS REPORTED REFTEL, HE AGREED LEAVE UNPUBLICIZED RESIGNA-
TION WITH PRESIDENT, AND GO ABROAD. THOSE SEEKING HIS REMOVAL HOPED
THAT BY THIS DEVICE PDRY WOULD NOT BE GIVEN A TARGET TO
CHARGE THAT AL-AYNI HAD BEEN VICTIM OF CONSERVATIVE, ANTI-
UNITY SENTIMENT. YAR OFFICIAL MEDIA HAVE ANNOUNCED ONLY
THAT AL-AYNI REQUIRED MEDICAL TREATMENT IN EUROPE AND
THAT IN INTERIM DEPUTY PRIMIN HASSAN MAKKI TO ACT
AS PRIMIN IN HIS STEAD. (NO PUBLIC REFERENCE HAS YET
BEEN MADE TO HIS FONMIN PORTFOLIO.)

9. AS REPORTED REFTEL, NU'MAN INFORMED ME THAT AL-IRYANI
WOULD MEET WITH KEY NATIONAL LEADERS DEC 16 TO CONFIRM
INTERIM CABINET DESIGNATIONS. NU'MAN ASKED IF IT WOULD
BE POSSIBLE FOR US TO TAKE SOUNDINGS WITH SAG ON ITS
REACTION TO VARIOUS CABINET SOMBINATIONS. I SAID NO;
USG COULD BE HELPFUL IN WORKING FOR PARALLELISM IN
BROAD POLICY LINES, BUT THIS WAS KIND OF NUANCE BEST
LEFT TO NEIGHBORS.

10. COMMENT: FROM AL-AYNI'S POINT OF VIEW, THAT MAY
YET BE PLAY IN THIS SITUATION. AS NOTED, RESIGNATION
HAS NOT BEEN PUBLICIZED AND MIGHT, THEREFORE, BE SUBJECT
TO WITHDRAWAL SHOULD PRESIDENT DECIDE NOT TO ACCEPT IT,
AS HAS HAPPENED BEFORE. AL-AYNI IS POLITICALLY ADROIT AND ONLY
ALTERNATIVE TO HIM WHO WE HEAR BEING DISCUSSED, ACTING
PRIMIN MAKKI, IS COMPARATIVELY UNKNOWN OUTSIDE YEMEN AND
HAS HAD LESS EXPERIENCE IN A HIGH OFFICE (BRIEFLY AS
FONMIN AND LATER AS AMBASSADOR TO BONN). HOWEVER, HE
IS GENERALLY RESPECTED AS AN INTELLIGENT IF SOMEWHAT
COLORLESS MODERNIST.

11. IF WE HAD TO MAKE A JUDGEMENT, IT WOULD BE THAT
AL-AYNI WOULD NOT IN THE SHORT TERM BE ABLE TO MANEUVER

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