

1973-12-13, Boumedienne, Kissinger, Meeting

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: President Houari Boumedienne of Algeria
 Foreign Minister Bouteflika (latter part of meeting)
 Secretary Henry A. Kissinger
 Assistant Secretary Joseph Sisco (latter part of meeting)
 Peter W. Rodman, NSC Staff *PMR*
 Interpreter

PLACE: The Presidency, Algiers

TIME AND DATE: Thursday, December 13, 1973
 11:20 a.m. - 1:15 p.m.

[The Secretary and Mr. Rodman were ushered into the President's office. The President was wearing a black cape and smoking a Havana cigar.]

President Boumedienne: I welcome you to Algeria. Did you have a good trip?

Secretary Kissinger: Yes. I am glad to have the opportunity to meet you.

President Boumedienne: It is good to have you in the Middle East.

Secretary Kissinger: I had not been in the Middle East [before my November visit].

President Boumedienne: It's the first time?

Secretary Kissinger: It is my second time in the Middle East. It is a complicated region.

President Boumedienne: It is not like Europe or the United States.

Secretary Kissinger: And it is a region that has had a heroic history -- and a tragic one.

President Boumedienne: It is a region of passion. Great problems and great passions.

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You were very pressed and you only devote a few hours to Algeria.

Secretary Kissinger: I had a long-standing engagement with President Sadat this evening. But I thought it was very important to have an exchange of views with you before. This is a period in which Algeria can morally and politically play a very important role.

President Boumedienne: In which direction?

Secretary Kissinger: I think, Mr. President, that Algeria, because of its revolutionary past and its present moral position, must have an understanding of what is being attempted. I read the President's press conference in which you said the American contribution would necessarily be at the expense of the Arabs.

President Boumedienne: In what magazine?

Secretary Kissinger: I read some text in which you said there were three possibilities: An Arab solution; an American-Soviet solution, and the least satisfactory was an American solution.

President Boumedienne: Yes.

Secretary Kissinger: I agree, there cannot be an outside solution. But I hope our two countries can learn to understand each other, so that you won't necessarily think an American solution is anti-Arab.

President Boumedienne: Now I think so. Permit me, because it is our first contact, to express my point of view frankly.

Secretary Kissinger: Please, I will do the same.

President Boumedienne: It is our style, the Algerian style of action. On U.S.-Algerian relations, on American foreign policy, I believe that U.S. foreign policy is the policy of the big stick. You have thrown the 100th or the 1000th bomb against the Third World, the economic bomb. The people of the Third World need capital, machines, cadres, knowledge. And you have great means, and you support causes which the Algerian people think unjust. This is a consequence of World War II, that the world is divided into two camps -- yours and the Socialist camp.

In recent years, you made a great overture to China, and you made a great initiative on your trip to the Soviet Union. You made a settlement in Indochina.

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The question is: By J NARA Date 4/10/88 nversion of the policy of the United States? Is the world still divided into two or three camps?

I am an Arab of the generation that has been subject to two kinds of humiliations: The humiliation of colonialism, British or French, and the colonialism that one calls Israel -- a country of 3 million that because of a certain massive support is the gendarme of the region.

Secretary Kissinger: I don't necessarily agree with your words, but I agree it was because of our support.

President Boumedienne: They must be put into place by the Egyptians and Syrians. In this context, objectively, there are three possibilities: An Arab peace, even one negotiated with Israel. Me, I negotiated with France. But that cannot be done by force. That's our great desire. Given that the world is as it is, and given that the United States and Russia exist, the other possibility is a Russian-American peace. It is they who arranged the ceasefire. It is the United States which plays the primary role in this negotiation.

I cannot be convinced that if it is an American peace it can be just. On one side [of the ledger] is the Vietnam peace, but also there is Israel. On one side was Pakistan, but on the other side was Chile.

Secretary Kissinger: You were for Pakistan?

President Boumedienne: Yes.

Secretary Kissinger: The President gives us too much credit for Chile.

President Boumedienne: This was a troubling case.

Secretary Kissinger: I tell you frankly that Allende faced an objectively complex situation. He wanted to make revolution, but he had no discipline, too many scruples, and too much inefficiency. We did not do anything to overthrow him.

I told your Foreign Minister that as a professor I wanted to make a study of revolution. This is why I am fascinated by Algeria. Seriously, I am fascinated by how revolutions start with inferior strength and how they convert psychological superiority into military superiority. In your case you analyzed correctly that you were bound to win if you did not lose.

President Boumedienne: Exactly.

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Secretary Kissinger didn't try to win in any normal sense. But for this you need great self-discipline. This was Allende's difficulty.

President Boumedienne: Perhaps we do give the Americans too much credit!

Secretary Kissinger: We did nothing to help him. We did not stop his suicide.

Let me now say a few words, first, about the American position. Speaking first in historical terms.

In some respects we find ourselves in the position of de Gaulle when he came into office. In order to change the basis of our foreign policy we had to continue it apparently in the old direction in order to change it. We inherited the war in Vietnam. Our problem was how to end it in such a way that we could conduct our other policies. Thus, while we would never have started it, we had to find a way of ending it which was somewhat complicated.

But this does not affect our fundamental view of international affairs -- which is that an attempt at physical dominance is incompatible with the objective tendencies and conditions of this period. Therefore, what we have attempted to do is encourage tendencies towards true independence, and to disengage America from -- I don't like the word "imperialism" -- but from the objective necessity of making decisions for every part of the world. Therefore, we welcome European unity and don't resist it, and we don't object if it occasionally attacks us. Because if it has a real spirit of independence, sooner or later it will defend itself against its real dangers. It needs the support of its people if it is to do this.

We don't do this out of charity but because any other course would exhaust us physically and psychologically.

Concerning the Middle East, it is clear that the United States has supported the State of Israel. And when the United States supports a state of 3 million people 6,000 miles from America, one has to ask for reasons.

I know many people think it is to gain military control in the Arab world. That is not true.

President Boumedienne: No, I don't believe that.

Secretary Kissinger: If Israel did not exist, the evolution of the Arab world would have been much slower. We would always have been able to find some Arabs who would be friends with us against other Arabs.

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Moreover, there is no objective reason for the Arab world to be in opposition to the United States. There are no conflicting interests.

So the real reason is the great strength of the Jewish Community in the United States, which, while not that large in number, has massive influence on communications, on means of finance, and hence on political life. And there were moral considerations of sympathy for the suffering of the Jewish people. But that doesn't mean the Arabs must pay the price for the suffering of the Jews in Europe. So I understand the Arab point of view.

So, while we were engaged in Vietnam and had massive internal difficulties, we didn't want to compound these difficulties by taking on the Jewish Community.

I told the Arab Foreign Ministers in the UN, even before the last war, that we would make a massive effort. I tell you frankly that without the war it almost certainly would have failed.

President Boumedienne: Some people disparagingly claim you might have exerted some influence on Sadat for that, so as to make a solution possible.

Secretary Kissinger: That is not true. But I was convinced at the outbreak of the war that Egypt would lose. Frankly, on the second day of the war we proposed a return to the line of demarcation because we expected that the Israelis soon would cross that line and we wanted the moral and legal basis to push them back.

So my estimation of the Arab armies was wrong.

What is the situation now? We see the situation now as making it necessary and desirable to bring a just peace to the region. It is not tolerable to have periodic wars that then involve the United States and the Soviet Union and that affect the whole world.

President Boumedienne: Do you think the Soviet Union would fight for the Arabs?

Secretary Kissinger: No.

President Boumedienne: I don't think so.

Secretary Kissinger: But mistakes are possible. Nevertheless it is a situation that is senseless. Also, we do not see why we should carry the permanent hostility of the Arab World, with which we have no American quarrels.

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There is a difference between you, Mr. President, and the United States. I think that when you make peace with Israel it will be a tactical phase. It is my instinct; I'm not sure. We frankly believe that the security of Israel also must be assured in the settlement -- but not by the constant occupation of Arab territory.

So we will make an effort, and we will work with the Arab countries to bring a settlement based on Security Council Resolution 242. And we do this not to have an American peace, because the only peace that will last in the Middle East must be based on the parties. We cannot be the gendarme of the Middle East on a permanent basis.

We don't want a Russian-American peace either, but we work with the Soviet Union because it is the only way to influence their actions. But we don't have the same objectives. Therefore, your second hypothesis, a U.S. - Soviet peace, is also wrong.

President Boumedienne: Where would the line be drawn between the United States and Russia in the region? And what are you aiming at? To recover all the territories of 1967?

Secretary Kissinger: I told President Sadat, so I will tell you the same thing: We don't need a recognized preferred position in Egypt, Algeria, or anywhere. We can afford to rely on the proposition that a nationalist Arab who wishes to improve the well-being of his own people will have many reasons for good relations with the United States. We don't need an exclusive position, and we have enough confidence that we can have a mature relationship based on mutual interest. What we want from the Arabs is simply negative. We don't want them to be bases, military or political, for another superpower.

President Boumedienne: So you accept a real independence of countries?

Secretary Kissinger: Absolutely.

President Boumedienne: You don't want American bases?

Secretary Kissinger: No. The only people worth dealing with are those who take responsibility for their own destiny. Because those who are clients of us today will be the clients of others tomorrow. Physical dependence becomes moral dependence. The British were even thrown out of Jordan. So, looking historically, I'd sooner rely on strong, truly independent Arab leaders than manifestations we see elsewhere.

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Let me be frank. If we have an understanding with you, or with President Sadat, we have some assurance over a period of time that it will be implemented. If we have an understanding with some Sheikdom in the Persian Gulf, what historical reality do they represent?

Our objective is to deal with the truly independent Arab states. If in your foreign policy you do things of which we violently disapprove, we will react. If we do things of which you violently disapprove, you will react, as we see often in the United Nations. But if this relationship isn't frozen in permanent hostility, we can live with it. And I told your Foreign Minister in Washington during the war that as soon as the war was over we would make a major effort. And I told him in the presence of more conservative Foreign Ministers of our respect for the revolutionary aspects of Algeria.

So what we seek in this is not an American solution but the possibility for Arab nations to free themselves of their obsession with Israel, and let the natural tendencies of the Arab world assert themselves.

The Europeans, Japanese, and even the Russians can say whatever they want. But they can't do anything about it. The only two peoples who can do anything are the Arabs, by war, and the United States, by diplomacy. Those are the facts.

President Boumediene: What you say interests me enormously, about revolution and about American foreign policy, as concerns Algeria and the Arab world. But recently the name of the United States was associated with those things, as I said, so now I'm not sure of the new tendencies. But I believe there won't be losers in this new competition.

Secretary Kissinger: So do I.

President Boumediene: There are the rich, you and the Soviet Union, and there are the poor, we socialists. Tractors cost the same whether I buy Caterpillars or Russian tractors. But Caterpillars are technically better.

You say you are concerned about our becoming a Russian base. Our concern is to liberate all our territory. I believe if United States policy in the Arab world takes adequate account of the factor of nationalism, it will be different. There are two factors which are obstacles, of veritable external domination. I asked you a rather brutal question...

Secretary Kissinger: I appreciate it.

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President Boumedienne: I asked you about where the line is between you and the Russians in this region. For us it's white sauce or red sauce. You would win in this competition.

Secretary Kissinger: I am not so confident in the competition with the Chinese, but I am in the other competition.

President Boumedienne: It would be a victory based on interests.

Secretary Kissinger: That's all we want.

President Boumedienne: It's your genius, your equipment. It won't be your Sixth Fleet or your Phantoms.

Secretary Kissinger: We have no interest in a military relationship with Arab countries. President Sadat said to me that anything militarily he did for the Soviets he would do for us. I said we don't need it. Our military relationship doesn't require it, for our requirements with the Soviet Union, and we have no intention to go to war with any Arab country.

President Boumedienne: Even for oil?

Secretary Kissinger: Oil is... a particular problem. I will get to that. But I don't believe it can be solved by military means. One problem is that of a certain dependence -- which is less for us than for Europe -- and which we will solve in five years.

The second problem is the problem of principle, and I will be brutally frank: we understand the embargo on the United States because of our action before the war and during the war. We understand. But now that we have changed our position and have a policy for which we will pay heavily domestically -- and for which I will pay heavily -- it is unacceptable that pressure is put on us while we are trying to get some of the Arab demands. It is morally difficult.

If after the negotiations have gone on for a certain period without satisfaction, then it would be understandable. But frankly it is our view that if the embargo is not lifted reasonably soon, then a number of difficulties will arise for us. First of all, there will be an anti-Arab feeling in the United States. Secondly, we will lose the possibility of defending our policy for American reasons. We will be accused of yielding to pressure. It will make it tremendously difficult. It would be much more effective for the

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Arabs if the boycott were lifted and at some point of deadlock in the negotiations it could be used as pressure on a particular point.

It was the President who raised the question of the embargo, not I.

The oil question has to be seen in the context of our relations with the Arab world. As long as I have influence, it will be more effective as a political than as an economic issue. Mr. President, you can understand -- if you were personally motivated only be economic considerations, you would be the President of a bank now. [Boumedienne smiles]

President Boumedienne: It is not oil and material means, but a matter of the sovereignty of nations. But there is in the back of our minds the origin of certain world wars. We recall the process of decolonization.

As for the Mideast question and oil, there is a problem now. I won't conceal from you the fact that each of us uses the weapons available to us.

Secretary Kissinger: Of course.

President Boumedienne: The United States, Russia and China use atomic weapons as weapons of deterrence to regulate their affairs.

In this oil affair, there are two fundamental questions -- what is your point of view, first, on the territories occupied in 1967? And what place in your policy is reserved for the Palestinian people?

If there is no solution, the detonators will take over. I won't hide it from you; it's a maladie of the Arabs. It will be settled by the extremists, the revolutionaries.

[At this point in the meeting Foreign Minister Bouteflika comes in, and Sisco is summoned].

President Boumedienne: On this policy of disengagement, the first phase, I asked Sadat if Israel were in agreement with this idea -- the beginning of withdrawal. I think this is not enough to bring about the lifting of the oil blockade. The conference will have so many people in it.

Secretary Kissinger: I have no question. This is why I was happy to have this chance to talk to you.

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One uses the weapons against an enemy. It is rare that one uses it against one who is asked to give assistance.

I told President Sadat that Nasser's mistake was to try to realize his objectives through hostility to the United States. It polarized the situation, which made it possible to place us on one side. So I think now the policy of engaging the United States with the Arab world is historically correct. So I think it would be a mistake to press the oil embargo to the point of serious economic dislocations in the United States.

On the questions you put -- the Arab Foreign Ministers can go to the Europeans and can get very clear answers. The only trouble is, they don't mean anything. We are the ones who will have to convince the Israelis to move, and we will have to do this against massive domestic pressures. Therefore, the Arab leaders must have enough confidence in us to let us choose the tactics to do it. We must organize ourselves domestically. We must use some psychological pressures on Israel to defer real pressures.

[Mr. Sisco enters]

Secretary Kissinger: When President Sadat said that the Israelis will withdraw to the Mitla Pass, what he said will probably be true, but it is not yet true. I told him it will be in January, but we need the time between then and now.

President Bounedienne: Forgive me for interrupting. Can't it be by the 18th? And you want the oil.

Secretary Kissinger: I tell all the Arab leaders that I don't promise what I can't deliver. In January I can bring it about, not before.

About the Golan Heights, my view is that the same principles that apply in Sinai should apply in part of Golan. Frankly, it will be infinitely more difficult. So it won't be before February. This is my judgment; this is my plan. Then we can go back to Sinai.

We recognize what has to be done about the occupied territory. But it would make no sense to make abstract declarations now.

On the Palestinians, there are two questions: First, who represents the Palestinians? And you answered this in part in Algiers.

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President Boumedienne: Who represents the Palestinians? That is determined by those who created the problem.

Secretary Kissinger: I assume that this conversation is between us?

President Boumedienne: Of course.

Secretary Kissinger: The question of the Palestinians has to be handled extremely circumspectly by us. We have had one preliminary contact with them with which you may be familiar. This week we sent a message because we didn't want it through the previous intermediary, for more direct contact. If we receive a reply, we could contact them without an intermediary.

President Boumedienne: You could meet with them yourself.

Secretary Kissinger: It would have to be in stages, because I am too well known. But it is not excluded.

The second question is what do the Palestinians really want? That may be the heart of the issue. I tell you my frank view: If they demand that every Palestinian can return, Israel will never accept it, whatever the pressure. If the Palestinians want some recognition and identity, we think that is conceivable.

This isn't something that you, Mr. President, will settle for them. But we don't reject the Palestinians as a group.

However, the biggest problem now is, first, to get the Conference started, and to begin a process of withdrawal for Israel. Because Israel has never withdrawn in its history. Once it has withdrawn, new forces come into play. That's why we let the Europeans and Japanese make their declarations.

President Boumedienne: It's a good thing. This will help you.

Secretary Kissinger: Yes. We don't pay attention to it; we're for it.

President Boumedienne: I think there is a flaw in your approach. For us, the question of the Palestinians is not subordinate to the question of the occupied territories. Our policy is, first, withdrawal from all the territories and, second, the rights of the Palestinians.

You say you're for a just peace. Without a Palestinian solution, there is no possibility. At Algiers, the Palestinian movement was uniquely the movement

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of the Palestinian people. Jordan, Gaza, are historically parts of Palestine. We seek an Arab peace. There are other goals, regional development, and so on.

Secretary Kissinger: It is impossible, Mr. President, on this trip...

President Boumedienne: I recommend direct contact with them to learn their point of view. Without it, you work at Geneva with a great handicap. Egypt, Syria, the Palestinians. We are for their propositions.

Secretary Kissinger: You know about the meeting that took place in Morocco?

President Boumedienne: Yes. But it was a contact of subalterns.

Secretary Kissinger: That's why we are establishing direct contact. Mr. President, I think on this trip it would be very dangerous and very destructive for me to do it. At this moment we're having unbelievable difficulties getting Israel to the Conference. I want to get them to the Conference; I want to get the first disengagement agreed to. I will tell you that while this goes on, I will be prepared to have contact with them - - if it can be arranged secretly - - once the first phase is over. But we must not have an explosion in America.

President Boumedienne: It is a tactical question.

Secretary Kissinger: It is a tactical question. In the meantime, I'm prepared to continue contact at a lower level. But I must be able to say to Congressmen - - and in Israel - - that I have not had contact with them. This is in the Palestinian interest.

President Boumedienne: Let them establish direct contacts, the Israelis. [laughter]

Secretary Kissinger: They will have to eventually.

Mr. President, it took me six weeks to get Israel to withdraw from Arab territory - - since I was in Cairo. I must do one thing at a time. I have not been idle. We need the discipline and confidence of the Arab leaders. Because if the Israelis can produce confrontations between Israel and the United States, this is a great victory for them. I appreciate that the Arab leaders can't be played games with. You are serious people. Therefore, I gave you the dates on which I think it can be done.

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President Boumedienne: You will meet this problem of the Palestinians -- in Syria.

Secretary Kissinger: Yes. I would appreciate it if you could convey this to them. This is really an important historical problem.

It would be dangerous for me. Politically, not physically.

President Boumedienne: I understand. The Palestinian question is a divisive one in the Arab world. As I said, I put the question where the dividing line runs in the Arab world between the United States and Russia.

Secretary Kissinger: Where do you think it runs?

President Boumedienne: Everything depends on a solution to the question. It can be a peaceful competition in the region.

Secretary Kissinger: Mr. President, serious people cannot be won. We are not going to win you.

President Boumedienne: Not through the big stick, no!

Secretary Kissinger: Not any way. You will act on your interests. So there will never be permanent victories. The question for us is whether your views and our views can be parallel. There are many questions on which we have no American reason to oppose.

We recognize no Soviet sphere and do not want any American sphere.

President Boumedienne: They are dissatisfied with your dynamism.

Secretary Kissinger: Yes, they are dissatisfied. But I'm not asking anything of any Arab country.

If they want to send Gromyko around, I don't object. [laughter]

President Boumedienne: I was in Moscow during the war.

Secretary Kissinger: Yes, I know.

But I think they have a more military conception, and more bureaucratic. We have a more historical and dynamic conception. Basically, if we're worried about Soviet dominance and don't want a Pax Americana, our interest is in strong governments that reflect the desires of their peoples.

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