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Authority **KND 969044** XDIS

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By **JW** Date **3-20-02** 9/13/89

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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Date **JUN 6 1973**

Initial **CD**

Memorandum of Conversation

DATE: May 30, 1973

SECRET

SECRET Faisal's Meeting with ARAMCO Officials

1973-5-30, Faisal, Aramco, Meeting

PARTICIPANTS:

- Mr. Henry Moses, Vice President, Mobil Oil Corporation
- Mr. Al DeCrane, Vice President, Texaco
- Mr. Charles Hedlund, Vice President, Esso Middle East
- Mr. Jones McQuinn, Vice President, Standard of California
- Mr. Joseph Johnson, Secretary of ARAMCO

- Honorable Joseph J. Sisco, Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs *slm*
- Mr. Rodger P. Davies, Deputy Assistant Secretary, NEA
- Mr. Alfred A. Atherton, Deputy Assistant Secretary, NEA
- Mr. Gordon Brown, EB/FSE
- Mr. Francois M. Dickman, Director, Arabian Peninsula Affairs

DISTRIBUTION: See attached sheet.

SUMMARY: Mr. Moses called to report on a meeting he had attended with King Faisal in Geneva the week before. Faisal had warned that if US policies in the Middle East remain unchanged, Saudi Arabia would find itself increasingly isolated in the Arab world. Since the Saudis did not intend this to happen, American interests in the area could no longer be preserved. Moses felt the US should take this warning very seriously. Mr. Sisco reviewed steps now underway to deepen US-Saudi relationships especially in the military field, our assessment of the Faisal-Sadat meeting which may have been the cause of the timing of Faisal's warning, and US efforts to inject a note of reality in the Arab-Israeli situation. **END SUMMARY.**

Mr. Moses said he wanted to report on a meeting he and all the other ARAMCO officials had had with King Faisal a week before (May 23). Before doing so, however, he wanted to recapitulate recent developments which helped explain Faisal's attitude.

NEA/ARP:FMDickman 5/30/73 *AWP*

(Drafting Office and Officer)

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SECRET

GDS--DECLASS Dec. 31, 1981

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BY S/SI

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DECLASSIFIED

Authority E.O. 12958

By W NARA Date 10/12/01**SECRET/SENSITIVE**

PAID COURTESY CALL ON HM TODAY, POWERS AND GODDARD PRESENT AND EVEN THOUGH WE HAD MADE IT ABSOLUTELY CLEAR WELL IN ADVANCE THAT THIS WAS STRICTLY COURTESY CALL HM NONETHELESS INVITED YAMANI AND SAGQAF TO BE PRESENT AS WELL AS RACHID PHARAOH AND MIR NAWWAF. HM WAS VERYCORDIAL AND AUDIENCE WENT ON FOR THIRTY MINUTES WHEN I FINALLY TOOK INITIATIVE TO BREAK IT UP.

HM WENT TO GREAT LENGTH TO EXPLAIN HIS PREDICAMENT IN MIDDLE EAST AS STAUNCH FRIEND OF USA AND HOW IT WAS ABSOLUTELY MANDATORY USG DO SOMETHING TO CHANGE THE DIRECTION THAT EVENTS WERE TAKING US IN THE MIDDLE EAST TODAY. WHILE HE REALIZED THE SITUATION WHICH EXISTED IN USA TODAY, HE NONETHELESS EMPHASIZED HE NOT ABLE TO STAND ALONE MUCH LONGER. HE BARELY TOUCHED ON THE USUAL CONSPIRACY IDEA BUT EMPHASIZED THAT ZIONISM AND ALONG WITH IT THE COMMUNISTS WERE ON VERGE OF HAVING AMERICAN INTERESTS THROW OUT OF THE AREA. HE MENTIONED THAT EXCEPT FOR SAUDI ARABIA TODAY IT WAS MOST UNSAFE FOR AMERICAN

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E.O. 12958, as amended, Sect 3.5

N/A 01-28/79 per 2420 16/06

By LSA Date 07/15/07

[1044]

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Authority E.O. 12958

By W NARA Date 01/20/01

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

INTERESTS AND IN SAUDI ARABIA WHERE HE EMPHASIZED THAT A DEEP-SEATED FRIENDSHIP HAD ALWAYS AND STILL EXISTED, IT WOULD BE MORE AND MORE DIFFICULT TO HOLD OFF THE TIDE OF OPINION THAT WAS NOW RUNNING SO HEAVILY AGAINST AMERICA. HE STATED THAT IT WAS UP TO THOSE AMERICANS AND AMERICAN ENTERPRISES WHO WERE FRIEND OF THE ARABS AND WHO HAD INTERESTS IN THE AREA TO URGENTLY DO SOMETHING TO CHANGE THE POSTURE OF THE USG. HE SAID A SIMPLE DISAVOWAL OF ISRAELI POLICIES AND ACTIONS BY THE USG WOULD GO A LONG WAY TOWARD QUIETING THE CURRENT ANTI-AMERICAN FEELING.

A NUMBER OF TIMES HE EMPHASIZED THAT TO ME AND TO ARAMCO AS A FRIEND WE MUST DO ALL POSSIBLE TO MOBILIZE AMERICAN OPINION AND SUGGESTED WE CONVINCED AMERICAN BUSINESS THAT THEY HAD A CRITICAL ROLE TO PLAY. I ATTEMPTED TO BRIEFLY TELL HIM WHAT WE WERE DOING IN THIS REGARD BUT ADMITTED WE WERE HAVING LIMITED, IF ANY, SUCCESS. I ALSO ADMITTED THAT WE HAD DONE VERY LITTLE IN SAUDI ARABIA OR IN THE MIDDLE EAST TO INDOCTRINATE AMERICAN BUSINESS FIRMS WHO HAD CONTRACTS ETC. IN THE AREA ON THIS PROBLEM. I TOLD HM THAT WE WOULD IMMEDIATELY EMBARK UPON A PROGRAM TO DO SO. HM STATED THAT HE WAS UTTERLY AMAZED AT THE FAILURE OF A GOVERNMENT OF A COUNTRY AS GREAT AS THE UNITED STATES TO RECOGNIZE WHAT ITS TRUE INTERESTS WERE AND WHAT THE INTERESTS OF ITS PEOPLE WERE. HE SAID IT WAS ALMOST INCONCEIVABLE IN ANY DEMOCRATIC STATE FOR A GOVERNMENT TO BE SO FAR AWAY FROM THE INTERESTS OF ITS PEOPLE.

[LWN 01-28/79]

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Authority E.O. 12958

By ^(M) NARA Date 10/12/01~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

THE TONE OF THIS MEETING, AS CONTRASTED WITH OTHER DISCUSSIONS WITH HM ON THIS SUBJECT, WAS ONE NOT OF BELABORING THE ISRAELI/ZIONIST/COMMUNIST PROBLEM BUT RATHER A WELL-REASONED AND CLEARLY STATED ONE OF EXTREME URGENCY THAT SOMETHING BE DONE TO CHANGE THE COURSE OF EVENTS. HE KEPT EMPHASIZING THAT IT WAS UP TO US AS AMERICAN BUSINESS AND AS AMERICAN FRIENDS TO MAKE OUR THOUGHTS AND ACTIONS FELT QUICKLY.

THE SUBJECT OF ENERGY AND OIL DID NOT COME UP EVEN THOUGH I WAS APPREHENSIVE OF THIS WHEN I REALIZED HE HAD CALLED IN SUCH A GROUP ESPECIALLY FOR THIS MEETING. IN RETROSPECT I BELIEVE THAT HE ASKED THESE PEOPLE TO ATTEND TO IMPRESS ME WITH THE SERIOUSNESS OF THE CONVERSATION EVEN THOUGH I HAD ASKED FOR A COURTESY VIST. HE WANTED TAKE THIS OPPORTUNITY TO ASK ARAMCO AND INDUSTRY TO APPLY THEMSELVES TO A PROBLEM HE CONSIDERED MOST URGENT.

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~[N-L-N 01-28/79]
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Authority E.O. 12958

By AW KARA Date 12-12-07~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

AFTER THE MEETING WE PAID A COURTESY CALL ON KAMAL ADHAM WHO ALSO PLACED GREAT EMPHASIS ON THE FACT THAT SAUDIS WERE STANDING ALONE AND THAT WHILE THIS WAS POSSIBLE NOW AND EVEN IN TIMES WHEN SAUDIS WERE HAVING PROBLEMS WITH EGYPTIANS AND YEMENIS, NONETHELESS HE SAID THAT WHEN HOSTILITIES BROKE OUT THIS WOULD BE ABSOLUTELY IMPOSSIBLE. HE STATED THAT THE MESSAGE YAMANI HAS BEEN ASKED TO DELIVER IN WASHINGTON REGARDING OIL APPLIED PRIMARILY AND FIRST OF ALL IF ANY HOSTILITIES BROKE OUT. HE SAID SAUDIS WERE NOT CONCERNED WITH WHAT MIGHT HAPPEN INTERNALLY AND WERE NOT CONCERNED WITH ABILITY TO PRODUCE ENOUGH OIL TO BE ECONOMICALLY VIABLE BUT THAT THEY WERE DEEPLY CONCERNED THAT THE TIDE OF EVENTS WOULD FORCE AMERICANS OUT OF THE AREA FOR GOOD, EVEN IN SAUDI ARABIA. HE ASKED ABOUT OUR THOUGHTS REGARDING PUBLIC SECURITY AND SECURITY OF OUR OIL INSTALLATIONS. WE MENTIONED TO HIM (AS HE KNEW) THAT AMIR WAYIF, VICE MININT, HAD BEEN IN THE EASTERN PROVINCE AND HAD DISCUSSED SECURITY MATTERS AT GREAT DETAILS WITH SOME OF OUR HIGH LEVEL PEOPLE AND WITH ME PERSONALLY AND THAT THE RESULTS OF HIS VISIT WAS A VERY NOTICABLE INCREASE IN SECURITY PRECAUTIONS OF ALL KINDS. WE DISCUSSED VARIOUS ASPECTS OF THIS BUT AT ONE POINT IN THE CONVERSATION ADHAM DID SAY THAT GOOD SECURITY WAS NOT A MATTER OF A LOT OF SOPHISTICATED EQUIPMENT AND THAT HE PERSONALLY HAD ALWAYS BEEN AGAINST SUCH SECURITY PACKAGES AS HAD BEEN PROPOSED IN THE RECENT PAST.

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[New 01-28/79]
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