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MIDDLE EAST: FAYSAL'S DIPLOMATIC OFFENSIVE
SCORES ITS FIRST SUCCESSES

The resumption of diplomatic relations between Egypt and Jordan and the Jordanian amnesty for most fedayeen offenders look like the first fruits of King Faysal's campaign to unify Arab ranks under his financial sponsorship. The chief losers are the fedayeen, who now face another crisis of leadership and purpose.

① PR Egy-Jordan

The New Alignment Takes Shape. In late August, just before their appearance at the nonaligned conference, Sadat and Faysal held a secret meeting in Riyadh. They apparently reached an understanding which led in September to the Cairo meeting of Sadat and Asad with King Husayn, who was thus redeemed after a year and a half of Arab ostracism. The immediate result of the Cairo Summit was the announcement of an Egyptian decision to resume the diplomatic relations with Jordan that were broken off, in April 1972, because of Husayn's proclamation of his plan for a United Arab Kingdom -- which Sadat had taken at the time as evidence of intent to conclude a separate peace with Israel.

On September 18, Husayn proclaimed an amnesty for "all convicts, detainees, and wanted people within and outside the Kingdom who had committed

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political crimes against state security with the exception of murder and espionage." Under the amnesty, hundreds of fedayeen are being released from Jordanian jails.

All these developments -- and possibly more to come -- seem to have been orchestrated by the golden baton of King Faysal. They involve a complex equation of quids and quos.

Saudi Objectives. King Faysal seems to be simultaneously animated by a felt need to shore up the conservative forces in the Arab world against the subversive inroads of radicalism, by resentment of Israeli expansion, and by a growing sense of mission to play an Arab leadership role. By forging the alliance with Sadat, he has further reduced the risk of unilateral Egyptian action against Israel and negotiated the rehabilitation of fellow-monarch Husayn. It is reasonable to assume that he is now working for restoration of diplomatic relations between Jordan and Syria, reconciliation between the GOJ and the fedayeen, and resumption of the Kuwaiti subsidy to Jordan. (Under the Khartoum agreement, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia were to grant Jordan approximately \$40 million a year, and Libya was to grant \$25 million a year. Only Saudi Arabia has kept up these payments since September 1970.)

Egyptian Objectives. For Sadat, the understanding with Saudi Arabia entails the immediate advantage of greater access to Saudi funds for meeting debts, buying arms, and buying wheat. Already, under the Saudi military aid program for Egypt, the Saudis have contracted to buy sophisticated

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British helicopters. Also, there are plausible reports that some of the advanced fighter aircraft for which Faysal is currently negotiating are intended for the Egyptian Air Force. Finally, Faysal has apparently promised to use his oil leverage in Washington in the interest of breaking the Israeli grip on Sinai.

Jordanian Objectives. Secure behind the military power of his East-Bank forces and Israel's unwritten security guarantee against Syrian invasion, King Husayn has felt no compulsion to sue for peace with Syria and Egypt. However, the generous US and Saudi subsidies are not enough to meet Jordan's perennial deficit. Husayn has a consequent interest in reconciliation with Egypt, Syria, and hopefully the fedayeen, as precludes to reinstatement of the Kuwaiti subsidy. The restoration of the Libyan subsidy would appear to be out of the question.

Syrian Objectives. Syria is another likely spot for judicious investment of Saudi capital. In temperament and outlook, Sadat and Asad seem very similar. Asad would welcome any decline of Qadhafi's influence in Cairo. Although Asad refuses to espouse Resolution 242, he seems to feel a need to end Syria's isolation in order to reduce the risk that Syria will be excluded from the benefits of any future settlement with Israel. Moreover, both he and Sadat can point to the Eastern Command to refute accusations of spinelessness toward Israel, even though none of the three "confrontation" states -- Syria, Jordan, and Egypt -- is likely to regard the establishment of an effective Eastern Command as feasible or even relevant to their dispute

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