

Authority *5012958*  
 By *D* NARA Date *4/10/8*

SECRET/NODIS (XGDS)

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS:

Israel

Lt. Gen. David Elazar, Chief of Staff  
 Maj. Gen. A. Adan, Commander, Southern Front  
 Col. D. Sion, Deputy Representative to Geneva  
 Military Working Group  
 Col. A. Levrin  
 Mr. Meir Rosenne, Legal Adviser, Ministry of  
 Foreign Affairs

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*Israel*

*Kilo 101*

Egypt

Maj. Gen. Mohammad Abdel Ghani Al-Gamasi,  
 Chief of Staff  
 Gen. Taha el-Magdoub, Egyptian Representative  
 to Geneva Military Working Group  
 Col. A. F. Howaidy, Egyptian Deputy Representative  
 to Geneva Military Working Group  
 Fawzy el Ibrashi, Ministry of Foreign Affairs

United Nations

Lt. Gen. Ensio P. H. Siilasvuo, Commander,  
 United Nations Emergency Force  
 Col. Hogan, Chief of Staff, UNEF  
 Renny Gorge, Political Adviser, UNEF  
 Capt. Fallon, UNEF

United States

Carlyle Maw, Legal Adviser, Department of State  
 Harold H. Saunders, National Security Council Staff

DATE AND PLACE:

12:15 - 1:15 p.m., January 18, 1974, in the United  
 Nations tent at Kilometer 101 on the road from  
 Cairo to Suez City in Egypt, on the occasion of the  
 signing of the "Egyptian-Israeli Agreement on  
 Disengagement of Forces in Pursuance of the  
 Geneva Peace Conference."

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DECLAS - Date Impossible to Determine.  
 BYAUTH - Dr. Henry A. Kissinger

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Before the meeting began, UN Political Adviser Gorge moved back and forth between the Israeli and Egyptian tents to resolve the question of how many each side would bring to the signing table. During that time, the procedures for signing were also explained to each side. It was agreed that, after the signing, there would be substantive discussion of principles to govern the talks between the chiefs of staff the following week. It was also agreed that the two US representatives would remain throughout that discussion.

Siilasvuo: I want to open the meeting by welcoming the distinguished Chief of Staff of Egypt and the Chief of Staff of Israel who have come this morning to sign an agreement on the disengagement and separation of forces. I also want to welcome the two representatives of the United States who have brought this agreement to me for your signature. I suggest we proceed at once to the signature. [At this point, four copies of the agreement (text attached) each in a red binder were passed in turn to the Egyptian and Israeli Chiefs of Staff for each to sign and for each to initial each of the other pages and the map. As each copy was initialed and signed, General Siilasvuo signed as witness and placed his stamp as UNEF Commander beside his signature. He and US State Department Legal Adviser Maw checked each copy to assure that the procedure had been completed. Then one copy each was given to the Egyptian and Israeli Chiefs of Staff, to General Siilasvuo for the UN and to Mr. Maw for the United States.]

Siilasvuo: The next item on the agenda is to set a date for the next meeting. What are your preferences, gentlemen?

Gamasi: I am prepared to meet at any time that is convenient for General Elazar.

Elazar: I would suggest meeting at 11:00 a.m. on Sunday (January 20).

Camasi: That is agreed.

Siilasvuo: Are there any other questions, for instance, procedures to be followed at the next meeting or other matters?

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Gamasi:

I think it would be useful to discuss the principles on which we can do our plan of work, if this is agreeable to you, General.

Elazar:

I am prepared to start with this discussion now. I believe it would be helpful.

Gamasi:

I have just written down a few principles on a plan that we might discuss through the five days of our next meetings. These principles are as follows:

1. Both sides will strictly observe the ceasefire on land, air, and sea. I gave orders to start this at 6:00 a.m. today. For the first day, I am not aware that there have been any violations.

Siilasvuo:

General Elazar gave a similar order, and I am not aware of any reports of violations today.

Gamasi:

[Continuing with the principles]

2. I would suggest that the disengagement be carried out in three phases:

- a. The first phase would last 15 days. During this phase Israeli forces would redeploy from the West Bank to the East Bank. Also the redeployment of the Egyptian Third Army would take place. The UN force would take over between the two sides as they disengage.
- b. The second phase would also last 15 days. During this time, Israeli forces would redeploy to the disengagement lines on the map. The Egyptian Second Army would complete its redeployment. The UN would take over in the northern sector of the Canal.
- c. The third phase would last 10 days. This would be time to check positions and armaments on the ground and to establish UN procedures of work.

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3. Evacuation of Israeli troops from the West Bank will begin in the South and move to the North in such a way as to release the sector including the Suez-Cairo road during the first three days. The reason for this is that we have part of our Third Army on the Eastern Bank. We want to proceed with the disengagement in that sector. If Israeli forces stay on the road, this redeployment will take longer. Also, it is very difficult for us to discuss disengagement in the Second Army area until the Third Army is clear. We have many troops to regroup in this area and we would like to get started as soon as possible.
4. The UN force should operate between both sides through all phases of the disengagement with five kilometers between. The UN would decide how this would be done.
5. There would be no destructions in the factories or installations in the Suez City area. This is important for us. It would give a good attitude on both sides if we found our installations not destroyed.

These are the principles I would suggest, but we can discuss them at our next meeting.

As far as the coming meeting is concerned, it could be at the Chief of Staff level. I am ready, but it is up to Israel. We want to finish our discussion accurately and quickly. If General Elazar wants to come to the next meeting only, that would be all right with me. I think it would be helpful for both of us to be at the next meeting to give quick decisions on the spot. Thank you.

Elazar:

I would like to say first that maybe it is a good sign that we have very similar ideas about the implementation of this agreement. Generally, we accept the principles General Gamasi outlined.

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## Specifically:

1. We are prepared to implement the agreement in three stages. We had thought about stages of 14, 14 and 12 days in order to evacuate the Western Bank within 28 days.
2. To start in the south and move to the north is accepted. We understand your interest in the problems of the Third Army. We are prepared to cooperate.
3. We had a similar idea on UN forces, though not exactly the same. We would like to have the UNEF come after us into the area we leave and transfer each area to Egypt. We thought about more than five kilometers, but that is something we can discuss in our next meeting.
4. About the installations and other properties in Suez, I will give very strict orders not to change anything from now. But unfortunately the war was fought over this area, and there have been many damages. But from now there will be no destruction.

I am prepared to participate in the next meeting. I suggest that we start with the Chiefs of Staff at the next meeting and then decide whether we should both participate in the later meetings. We are both very busy, but these meetings are very important. It is very important to start them in good relations. We on the Israeli side have no other interest but to honor this agreement in spirit and in letter. We believe this spirit will help in the honoring of other agreements in the future.

Gamasi:

Thank you. Again we are very close in our ideas. We accept any procedure to be worked out by the UN. If it seems desirable to have a wider zone under UN control, that would be OK with us. We also agree that the territory left by Israeli forces should be transferred to the UN and then to Egypt. There is absolutely no objection on this. As for the coming meeting, I agree that we will both be present. Then our next meeting will be at 11:00 a.m. on Sunday.

Now, I would like to know the answer to one question. When you talk about 28 days, are you thinking of one phase or two?

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Elazar:

We have prepared a map to represent the principles I was talking about with some stages. This can certainly be changed. We just drew the map roughly to show you the idea. We do not mean that this should be a final solution. It is simply for us to discuss. I will show you this map.

[At this point, Colonel Sion laid a map in front of General Gamasi and explained the principles. The map shown was covered by an overlay on which were drawn zones numbered 1 through 3 indicating the areas that would be evacuated in each phase. In general, Colonel Sion explained that the Cairo-Suez Road would be opened in the first 48 hours from the beginning of disengagement. The secondary road unblocking the Kabrit area would be opened somewhat later. During this time the Third Army could regroup in the South. The map showed Israeli withdrawal to the north and then toward the east with the UN along the ceasefire lines in the northern sector to protect both sides during the regrouping. He concluded by emphasizing that the procedure reflected on the map was open for discussion.]

Elazar:

If you have any reactions now, General, we would be glad to have them and then we could prepare some changes in our approach before our meeting on Sunday.

Gamasi:

First, it seems to me that 28 days are more than enough to complete the redeployment. If we can make it faster, it may help from a psychological viewpoint for our troops. Second, I would like to finish in the south first rather than stretch the process there over 28 days. If we can just make these 28 days faster, it will help. I suggest 15; you suggest 28; perhaps we can make a compromise at 20.

Elazar:

I have no objection in principle. Our problem is a logistical one of evacuating an area where we have quite big forces. The time will depend only on our logistical ability to evacuate. If there is any ability to shorten the time, we will study it. But it is only a logistical problem.

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