



Authority NND 961044 5/3
By RG Date 4-3-73

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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December 1973 NODIS REVIEW

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A73-12-3, Faisal, oil, Embargo

TO: T - Mr. Donaldson

FROM: S/PC - Winston Lord W

FROM: The Yamani Visit; Can We Ease the Embargo?

Reviewed by: Allen
Date: 2/14/78

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Our upcoming discussions with Saudi Petroleum Minister Zaki Yamani can substantially influence Saudi policy on the oil embargo. It is, therefore, very important that we decide what message we want to convey to him and that senior US officials with whom he meets are consistent in their approach.

What follows is an outline of the problem, a statement of what we really want to get across to Yamani, and suggested talking points. Finally, there is a suggestion of certain proposed actions to be initiated parallel to our discussions which, however, should not be mentioned to Yamani.

Should you and the Secretary concur in the following, the positions set forth should be adhered to by all US Government officials with whom Yamani meets.

THE SETTING

We are confronted with an oil embargo called Arab. In fact, several of the oil producing states have already broken ranks. The key players are the Saudis. If they hold, it hurts; if they do not, there is no embargo.

King Faisal has announced that there can be no lifting of the embargo until there is an acceptable

(Handwritten initials)

S/PC - Winston Lord

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