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TO : THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON.

June 27, 1956
DATE

REF : ADDIS ABABA CHAKO LES. REP L

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SUBJECT: POLITICAL SITUATION IN THE SUDAN.

1956-6-27, Azhari, US, Aid

Reference is made to the Department's instruction No. GAZ-8750, May 7, 1956, on the subject "Instructions for Ambassador Lowell C. Pinkerton. The following views are the result of conversations with members of the present Government and, as this Government is expected to resign within the near future bringing a change in leadership, they must be considered preliminary.

POLITICAL

1. On several occasions I have told members of the Government that the United States has been pleased to take the initiative in proposing Sudan for membership in the United Nations, and that we are prepared to be helpful to them in every appropriate way in connection with such membership. In each instance I have found them appreciative and inclined to give us full credit for smoothing their way. They take great stock in UN membership which they consider will be recognition of their full sovereignty and for this reason our contribution is accorded the importance it deserves.

2. In a long conversation with the Minister of Finance, I discussed our policy with regard to economic and military assistance and contrasted it with the Soviet policy. I told him we did not ask any country to take aid from us and added that we were not bidding against the Soviet Bloc because their aid was granted on the assumption of unseen subversion whereas ours does not in any sense have subversion as its ultimate purpose.

At his request I gave him a copy of the Technical Cooperation Agreement with Egypt which he said he would like to study. He also took copies of the Military Assistance Agreements with Lebanon and Iraq, although he said Sudan was not at present interested in acquiring military aid from any source. It was made clear to him that all these agreements represented various types and were not intended to be used for purposes of negotiation.

The Minister said the policy of the present Government was against asking for or accepting economic assistance from any country,

LCPinkerton/bhp
REPORTER

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out he was held and a government with a popular mandate on a secure political basis was formed. He himself is opposed to accepting aid because he believes everything has come too easily to the Sudanese and the acceptance of aid when it is not needed might give them the idea that they will always be looked after without any effort on their part. He said the Sudanese are not now working like they should and they must be forcibly impressed with the need to do so.

COMMENT: Willingness to accept assistance from various agencies of the UN is an indication that nationalism rather than economics is back of the policy to refrain from accepting aid from any country. The Minister also believed that acceptance of aid would interfere with their negotiations with Egypt which might well resent apparent Sudanese reliance on any other country. I repeated that we were not asking Sudan to accept our aid but we wanted the Government to know of our willingness to be of assistance. He expressed appreciation for this attitude and said our past friendship for the Sudan was ample evidence of our sincere desire to be of help, with no ulterior purpose in mind.

3. Relations of Egypt with the members of the Sudanese Government were the subject of my despatch No. 182 of June 16, 1956. The Minister of Foreign Affairs told me they had not been greatly disturbed by the announcement of our willingness to participate in financing the High Aswan Dam because he was sure our participation in the project would depend upon previous agreement between Egypt and the Sudan on the Nile waters, but he said he was appreciative of our action in putting the record straight in that regard. He hoped good relations with Egypt would continue and he was making every effort to maintain them but said Egypt was being very difficult in settling outstanding problems. He repeated that no responsible Sudanese political leader would be willing to accept the status of an appendage of Egypt.

4. The members of the Government, including the Prime Minister and the Minister of Foreign Affairs, with whom I have discussed the question of recognition of Red China, have assured me the Government has no intention of recognizing any Chinese Government, Communist or Nationalist. They also say they are not interested in exchanging diplomatic representatives with North Korea, Communist Vietnam or East Germany. They are becoming cool toward East Germany with which they were unwittingly thrown into fairly close relations by Azhari's expansive friendliness and with whom they signed one of their four trade agreements.

MILITARY

The results of my conversations regarding Soviet and other Communist Bloc, particularly Czechoslovak, offers of military assistance were the subject of my despatch No. 159 of May 19, 1956.

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est in acquiring some transport plane
 was ment
 They had
 British prices too high. The British Ambassador told me their
 sole interest seemed to be in Viscounts and delivery would be delayed
 even if they could find the money to finance any such purchase.
 There is no evidence of any intention in responsible circles at
 present to build a larger military establishment than the economy
 of the country will support.

ECONOMIC

1. Frequently I have expressed to the Minister of Finance our
 willingness to be of any appropriate help to Sudan in qualifying
 for membership in the International Monetary Fund and the Inter-
 national Bank. This offer has been appreciated and recent develop-
 ments show it was not interpreted as an idle gesture. The Govern-
 ment is using both the United States and the United Kingdom in
 their efforts to gain membership in both the Fund and the Bank now
 that final steps have been taken to establish an independent
 Sudanese currency. Applications for membership have been submitted
 within the last few days.

2. Both the political and economic aspects of technical and
 development assistance were discussed with the Minister of Finance.
 I told him that we were prepared, should the Government so desire,
 to send a small technical group to Khartoum to discuss Sudan's need
 for technical and development assistance and the extent to which
 the United States could render such assistance. The results of
 these discussions are described in an earlier paragraph of this
 despatch. The level of the aid which might be contemplated did
 not arise. I consider it unlikely that we will receive a request to
 send an exploratory mission and I believe it would be a mistake to
 press the matter in the present political situation, with a change of
 Governments expected very soon.

3. On the subject of experts, I told the Minister of Finance
 that the Government of the United States appreciates the problems
 involved in the organization of the fiscal system and government
 administration and wants him to know that we are prepared to make a
 contribution to the solution of his problems if he so desired. I
 told him we did not want to intrude nor to compete with others whom
 the Sudan felt were qualified to meet their requirements. The pos-
 sibility of making some U. S. Government experts available and of
 participating in their remuneration was mentioned and I emphasized
 that our offer was being brought to his attention for such action,
 now or in the future, which he considered to be in his best interests.
 He thank me and said that he would probably request our assistance
 from time to time in recruiting experts he needed.

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