

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

1973-9-18, US, Kissinger

Participants: Ambassador Donald Reinhard
Mr. Henry A. Kissinger
Mr. Richard Campbell

Time and Place: 2:45 p.m.
Tuesday, September 18, 1973
The White House

Mr. Kissinger: Can you explain to me the relationship between the Cultural

Affairs Office and USIA? What does the Assistant Secretary for Cultural

Affairs do? Who sends the artists abroad?

Ambassador Reinhard: He does.

Mr. Kissinger: Are we doing as much as we could?

Ambassador Reinhard: No.

Mr. Kissinger: What could we do?

Ambassador Reinhard: Africa has actually done well. I think we've done well specifically in Nigeria, but more can be done with it.

Mr. Kissinger: When I think of the impact that China gets from their cultural exchange program I often wonder why we can't do the same.

Ambassador Reinhard: Possibly even on less money.

Mr. Kissinger: Could we do it? But this, of course, is not what I wanted

to talk to you about.

Ambassador Reinhard: Well you certainly could do it. It is more difficult to organize in a democratic society. You have to get the artists together.

You're bound By Amb. Reinhard problems as each Congressman is backing his own home symphony orchestra. But these difficulties are, not impossible.

Mr. Kissinger: What you're saying is it can be done but there are managerial problems.

Amb. Reinhard: Yes. The Agency is the primary manager outside the United States. The Department controls the budget and manages those programs

inside the United States. This is not good.

Mr. Kissinger: Why don't we talk about Africa. This is a continent about which I know nothing. I have taken one trip to East Africa and one to South Africa on a lecture tour. Have you ever been there?

Ambassador Reinhard: Yes.

Mr. Kissinger: How do they treat you? Do they put you up in white hotels?

Ambassador Reinhard: Yes, but it's all by special arrangement. If a non-white

just shows up and gets off the plane he's in trouble.

Mr. Kissinger: I actually got the idea that they weren't racists like Americans. This, of course, was just my feelings for being there a short time. I don't think the boors feel inferior. I think they just feel they're different.

Ambassador Reinhard: I think it's more absolute fear. They are so outnumbered.

Mr. Kissinger: I once heard about a toast between the Americans and South Africans explaining the difference in attitude. When we speak of dignity

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it we give/a ~~university~~ the Governor of South Africa then stood up
and said, "We agree, that's why we give it boundaries." In my confirmation hearings I was asked if I should move in Africa. Can we do more?

Ambassador Reinhard: There are primarily two problems. One is development, which is a very pragmatic problem and can be handled.

The second problem is South Africa. The problem is more social and is not so easy. We have the image of being indifferent. We have the statistics on our side, but they claim we leave it to the French, Belgians and Portuguese.

Actually, there is no such thing as Africa. There are 42 countries, some important and some not so important, 10 of which make a good deal of importance, Nigeria being among them.

Mr. Kissinger: Everyone agrees that you are doing a great job.

Ambassador Reinhard: It's nice to be popular. On development, I think we can be more imaginative in our aid. I think the bilateral route is doubtful politically. If we go the multilateral route they will know where the World Bank money came from and I think the multilateral aid can be more imaginative. For instance, in Nigeria we should go the straight commerical route. For example, the airlines are possibly the worst managed I've ever seen. They are now getting managerial aid from TWA. This is really meaningful aid. That type of help can do more good than bilateral aid. The South Africa problem is much more difficult. It is years away from any conclusion. Black Africans have given up on evolution and now are beginning to advocate revolution.

Ambassador Reinhard: They realize this. You notice that no one expects us to put up the 40,000 troops necessary to do the job. But what can we do?

Chrome is a good example. Repeal of the Byrd amendment would help. We need to find a way to get the Portuguese and insurgents to talk. Another thing to keep in mind is that they think we have more influence than we actually do.

Mr. Kissinger: What should we do?

Ambassador Reinhard: Well, we should pursue a role of absolute frankness.

Mr. Kissinger: But what do we tell the black Africans?

Ambassador Reinhard: We must set up a dialogue. The dialogue with the black Africans should concentrate on the progress in evolution. It should explain what has happened lately and what the signs are of progress.

Mr. Kissinger: Now I'm going to play the devil's advocate for a while.

Why do we have to get involved?

Ambassador Reinhard: The black Africans say we have a moral responsibility.

Mr. Kissinger: But the black Africans, on the whole, join the non-aligned block and vote against us in the UN. How can they vote against us and expect to get our support?

Ambassador Reinhard: The answer they would give is that they've given up on you, that they would prefer that we would take a much different course.

Mr. Kissinger: Would they then vote for us?

Ambassador Reinhard: Maybe they would, but they certainly would make no promises.

Ambassador Reinhard: That's right. They want solutions to the problems overnight and they know we can't do that. Investments are the kinds of things that need to be discussed. Right now there is not much dialogue between us and the black Africans.

Mr. Kissinger: Then what do we tell the South Africans?

Mr. Reinhard: We must tell them that this situation can't go on, and that they must avoid conflagration.

Mr. Kissinger: Do they recognize that it can't go on?

Ambassador Reinhard: I think so. Many of them talk as if they understand.

Mr. Kissinger: But in the Government they talk that way?

Ambassador Reinhard: Yes, they do, on various levels. They all claim they can't do it now that they will leave it to the next generation.

Mr. Kissinger: But that won't satisfy the black Africans.

Ambassador Reinhard: We must persuade them to move faster.

Mr. Kissinger: Let me get philosophical. Isn't this the problem? A

democratic form of government assumes a homogeneous perception of the population. This doesn't work with sharp, racial differences. The question is, is it better for the majority to oppress the minority, or the other way around? How does the majority every accept anything less than their full position? This seems to be the major problem.

Ambassador Reinhard: That's exactly the same problem among the black Africans. All the tribes tend to be independent.

Ambassador Reinhard: I don't know.

Mr. Kissinger: What do we tell the West Africans? I left it in a total feeling of hopelessness. Even in West Africa I have trouble doing anything.

Ambassador Reinhard: The Portuguese had an opportunity to have an integrated society not long ago, but lost the opportunity. They have little or no leverage now. Meanwhile there's a good deal of frustration. The Chrome problem is hot, even in Nigeria.

Mr. Kissinger: The Chrome problem we can resolve. We will back the Byrd amendment.

Mr. Reinhard: I don't think we should fool ourselves that that will have any great impact.

Mr. Kissinger: How about in Nigeria?

Ambassador Reinhard: Not as much as I would have hoped.

Mr. Kissinger: How do you find the leadership?

Ambassador Reinhard: Well, they're certainly not intellectual. They are really politicians in uniform. Speaking of politicians, do we have any word yet on my Prime Minister's visit?

Mr. Kissinger: He's coming to the UN.

Ambassador Reinhard: Yes. We sent a paper that he wanted to see the President on October 6.

Mr. Kissinger (to Campbell): Be sure we find out where that stands.

Mr. Reinhard: He should enter the country on the 4th, be at the UN on the 5th, and wants to see the President on the 6th.

Mr. Kissinger: _____ When Javits was there he said he must get the

Ambassador Reinhard: When Foreign Relations Committee together when he gets here.

Mr. Kissinger: That also is a Jewish holiday which means you'll never get the news men together. October 6 is the Day of Atonement, but we have to do it.

Mr. Reinhard: How about 45 minutes if he goes to Key Biscayne?

Mr. Kissinger: He may do it.

Ambassador Reinhard: You could have an 11:00 meeting, followed by a working lunch.

Mr. Kissinger: Mr. Reinhard, he doesn't have lunch with anyone.

Ambassador Reinhard: Well, how about half-an-hour to an hour?

Mr. Kissinger: Where is my book of names? (Campbell leaves to get book of names). See what my geniuses do for me? Do you think there is going to be culture shock in the State Department?

Ambassador Reinhard: You've warned them.

Mr. Kissinger: Yes, but they don't believe it. Ball once gave a speech like that and one foreign service officer turned to the one beside him and he said,

"Famous first words."

Mr. Reinhard: I don't think you'll have that kind of problem.

Mr. Kissinger: If they're serious about wanting influence in policy, this is the only chance they may get in the next ten years. While I may be a pain in the neck I can develop on a spree. Now in Africa, one problem may be

intellectual. This tends to make a difference in Latin America. Do you think it more. This tends to make a difference here?

Ambassador Reinhard: Certainly.

Mr. Kissinger: The only one I have ever met is Mobuto, and he is weird.

But I wouldn't put Gowan in that category. When I saw Mobuto he said he simply had to have six gun boats. So I scrounged around and got six gun boats. He later went to New York, saw their fire boats and traded his six gun boats for three fire boats.

Mr. Reinhard: One thing you should realize about the leadership is that the old time leaders are all dead or dying. (Mr. Kissinger takes a call from Bryce Harlow asking for suggestions for the Congressional Relations job.)

Mr. Kissinger: Is there any way we can generate a way out? (Mr. Kissinger takes call from Eagleburger concerning the transcript of the hearings).

Frankly, we didn't know out of this office what to do. We can do something just to be doing something, but where do we go?

Ambassador Reinhard: . . . (Campbell leaves room to take call. When he returns they are still discussing African policy). We'll always have the tribal problem. There is no dominant tribe. This may largely be a problem of leadership.

Mr. Kissinger: I've got to go to Africa in the next year and a half.

Ambassador Reinhard: I think that would be very helpful. I think you should do more of this.

Ambassador Reinhard: Yes, just after the war.

Mr. Kissinger: How long ago was that?

Ambassador Reinhard: Two years ago.

Mr. Kissinger: What are the best Ambassadors in Africa:

Ambassador Reinhard: One of the best is Todman in Guinea. Another man who is wasted is Eisem.

Mr. Kissinger: Yes, that's what many say. What do you think of Eisem?

Ambassador Reinhard: In general, I think well of him, but I know little of his performance.

Mr. Kissinger: Why was he assigned to _____?

Ambassador Reinhard: I imagine it was open. It's his first ambassadorial assignment.

Mr. Kissinger: What are your impressions of the Foreign Service?

Ambassador Reinhard: I think they are good people with a very poor personnel system. I like the military personnel system more. In the Foreign Service everyone gets to be an ambassador after so many years, whether they're qualified or not. If there are 5,000 people in the Foreign Service, there must be 400 good people, no more and no less. Ambassadors should not be sent to a post just because they have 30 years.

Mr. Kissinger: How do I attempt changes?

Ambassador Reinhard: Do to the Director General. Tell him what you want.

Mr. Kissinger: Who would be good to appoint to that?

Ambassador Reinhard: The rumors I hear and that I wholly agree with is

Dean Brown, _____: heduled to do that job before he went to Jordan.

Mr. Kissinger: Which is more important position? Management or the Foreign Service job?

Ambassador Reinhard: Management. There's no question about it.

Mr. Kissinger: Who's your second choice?

Ambassador Reinhard: The Assistant Secretary for Africa.

Mr. Kissinger: Is he tough enough?

Mr. Reinhard: Given the authority.

Mr. Kissinger: Now, between you and me, everytime I talk to a Foreign Service officer he keeps telling me how I must increase their authority. Why would Newsome be tougher if I gave him more authority in that job?

Ambassador Reinhard: Newsome has not had a job where he had to accomplish anything. Given the task, he will be tough.

Mr. Kissinger: Won't that man have to be tough?

Ambassador Reinhard: Yes. But much of it will be between the Secretary and the Under Secretary. The heads can be knocked together further down the line.

Mr. Kissinger: What's your third choice? What do you think of Eisem?

Ambassador Reinhard: He was in personnel before (ponders). I think I'd better beg off. I don't know enough.

Mr. Kissinger: Well, give me your third choice.

Ambassador Reinhard: How about the Counsel General of Hong Kong?

Dave Osborne.

Ambassador Reinhard: I think strength comes from authority. At the top the people have always known precisely how far they could go.

Mr. Kissinger: What do you think of Lorum?

Ambassador Reinhard: I don't know him.

Mr. Kissinger: What about an Assistant Secretary for AF?

Ambassador Reinhard: I think you should go outside the African area. Someone like Dave Osborne.

Mr. Kissinger: What does he know about Africa?

Ambassador Reinhard: Nothing. Or possibly Lenhardt, but he has some personal problems.

Mr. Kissinger: With his wife?

Ambassador Reinhard: Yes.

Mr. Kissinger: Why go outside?

Ambassador Reinhard: I don't see an Assistant Secretary/in Africa right now. Carter in Tanzania is good.

Mr. Kissinger: Isn't he a showboat?

Ambassador Reinhard: From a PR point of view he's perfect. It depends on what you want him to do. If you're naming the best people in Africa, he's one of them.

Mr. Kissinger: What about the spokesman job? Can you help me resolve the problem of whether to use a newsman or FSO?

Ambassador Reinhard: I'd use some of both. There are some newsmen who are former FSO's.

Ambassador Reinhard: Well, there can't be many of them. But there are probably more than you think.

Mr. Kissinger: Carter was one.

Mr. Reinhard: But there are others.
Probably more in USIA than in the Department.

Mr. Kissinger: When do you go back?

Mr. Reinhard: Immediately. In the next day or two.

Mr. Kissinger: Leave me a list of officers who have impressed you. What type of job they'd be good for. Some of their strengths and weaknesses.

Give it to Dick. Before you make definite plans to return check with Dick. I might want to see you again before you go back. You certainly can go back by Thursday night.