

Authority *5012958*
 By *D* NARA Date *4/10/8*

SECRET/NODIS (XGDS)

January 18, 1974

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS:

Israel

Lt. Gen. David Elazar, Chief of Staff
 Maj. Gen. A. Adan, Commander, Southern Front
 Col. D. Sion, Deputy Representative to Geneva
 Military Working Group
 Col. A. Levrin
 Mr. Meir Rosenne, Legal Adviser, Ministry of
 Foreign Affairs

Egypt

Maj. Gen. Mohammad Abdel Ghani Al-Gamasi,
 Chief of Staff
 Gen. Taha el-Magdoub, Egyptian Representative
 to Geneva Military Working Group
 Col. A. F. Howaidy, Egyptian Deputy Representative
 to Geneva Military Working Group
 Fawzy el Ibrashi, Ministry of Foreign Affairs

United Nations

Lt. Gen. Ensio P. H. Siilasvuo, Commander,
 United Nations Emergency Force
 Col. Hogan, Chief of Staff, UNEF
 Renny Gorge, Political Adviser, UNEF
 Capt. Fallon, UNEF

United States

Carlyle Maw, Legal Adviser, Department of State
 Harold H. Saunders, National Security Council Staff

DATE AND PLACE:

12:15 - 1:15 p.m., January 18, 1974, in the United
 Nations tent at Kilometer 101 on the road from
 Cairo to Suez City in Egypt, on the occasion of the
 signing of the "Egyptian-Israeli Agreement on
 Disengagement of Forces in Pursuance of the
 Geneva Peace Conference."

XGDS - 1

DECLAS - Date Impossible to Determine.
 BYAUTH - Dr. Henry A. Kissinger

SECRET/NODIS (XGDS)

1974-1-18

~~*1216-100*~~

~~*Sadai*~~

~~*Sadai*~~

Sadai

Israel

Kilo 101

Authority 5012958
SECRET, By D NARA Date 4/10/88

- 3 -

Gamasi:

I think it would be useful to discuss the principles on which we can do our plan of work, if this is agreeable to you, General.

Elazar:

I am prepared to start with this discussion now. I believe it would be helpful.

Gamasi:

I have just written down a few principles on a plan that we might discuss through the five days of our next meetings. These principles are as follows:

1. Both sides will strictly observe the ceasefire on land, air, and sea. I gave orders to start this at 6:00 a.m. today. For the first day, I am not aware that there have been any violations.

Siilasvuo:

General Elazar gave a similar order, and I am not aware of any reports of violations today.

Gamasi:

[Continuing with the principles]

2. I would suggest that the disengagement be carried out in three phases:

- a. The first phase would last 15 days. During this phase Israeli forces would redeploy from the West Bank to the East Bank. Also the redeployment of the Egyptian Third Army would take place. The UN force would take over between the two sides as they disengage.
- b. The second phase would also last 15 days. During this time, Israeli forces would redeploy to the disengagement lines on the map. The Egyptian Second Army would complete its redeployment. The UN would take over in the northern sector of the Canal.
- c. The third phase would last 10 days. This would be time to check positions and armaments on the ground and to establish UN procedures of work.

SECRET/NODIS (XGDS)

DECLASSIFIED

- 4 -

SECRETAuthority *5012958*
By *J* NARA Date *4/10/88*

3. Evacuation of Israeli troops from the West Bank will begin in the South and move to the North in such a way as to release the sector including the Suez-Cairo road during the first three days. The reason for this is that we have part of our Third Army on the Eastern Bank. We want to proceed with the disengagement in that sector. If Israeli forces stay on the road, this redeployment will take longer. Also, it is very difficult for us to discuss disengagement in the Second Army area until the Third Army is clear. We have many troops to regroup in this area and we would like to get started as soon as possible.
4. The UN force should operate between both sides through all phases of the disengagement with five kilometers between. The UN would decide how this would be done.
5. There would be no destructions in the factories or installations in the Suez City area. This is important for us. It would give a good attitude on both sides if we found our installations not destroyed.

These are the principles I would suggest, but we can discuss them at our next meeting.

As far as the coming meeting is concerned, it could be at the Chief of Staff level. I am ready, but it is up to Israel. We want to finish our discussion accurately and quickly. If General Elazar wants to come to the next meeting only, that would be all right with me. I think it would be helpful for both of us to be at the next meeting to give quick decisions on the spot. Thank you.

Elazar:

I would like to say first that maybe it is a good sign that we have very similar ideas about the implementation of this agreement. Generally, we accept the principles General Gamasi outlined.

SECRET/NODIS (XGDS)

~~SECRET~~ Authority 5012958
By J NARA Date 4/10/88

- 5 -

Specifically:

1. We are prepared to implement the agreement in three stages. We had thought about stages of 14, 14 and 12 days in order to evacuate the Western Bank within 28 days.
2. To start in the south and move to the north is accepted. We understand your interest in the problems of the Third Army. We are prepared to cooperate.
3. We had a similar idea on UN forces, though not exactly the same. We would like to have the UNEF come after us into the area we leave and transfer each area to Egypt. We thought about more than five kilometers, but that is something we can discuss in our next meeting.
4. About the installations and other properties in Suez, I will give very strict orders not to change anything from now. But unfortunately the war was fought over this area, and there have been many damages. But from now there will be no destruction.

I am prepared to participate in the next meeting. I suggest that we start with the Chiefs of Staff at the next meeting and then decide whether we should both participate in the later meetings. We are both very busy, but these meetings are very important. It is very important to start them in good relations. We on the Israeli side have no other interest but to honor this agreement in spirit and in letter. We believe this spirit will help in the honoring of other agreements in the future.

Gamasi:

Thank you. Again we are very close in our ideas. We accept any procedure to be worked out by the UN. If it seems desirable to have a wider zone under UN control, that would be OK with us. We also agree that the territory left by Israeli forces should be transferred to the UN and then to Egypt. There is absolutely no objection on this. As for the coming meeting, I agree that we will both be present. Then our next meeting will be at 11:00 a.m. on Sunday.

Now, I would like to know the answer to one question. When you talk about 28 days, are you thinking of one phase or two?

SECRET/NODIS (XGDS)

DECLASSIFIED

Authority *SAL/2958*
By *D* NARA Date *4/10/88*SECRET

- 6 -

Elazar:

We have prepared a map to represent the principles I was talking about with some stages. This can certainly be changed. We just drew the map roughly to show you the idea. We do not mean that this should be a final solution. It is simply for us to discuss. I will show you this map.

[At this point, Colonel Sion laid a map in front of General Gamasi and explained the principles. The map shown was covered by an overlay on which were drawn zones numbered 1 through 3 indicating the areas that would be evacuated in each phase. In general, Colonel Sion explained that the Cairo-Suez Road would be opened in the first 48 hours from the beginning of disengagement. The secondary road unblocking the Kabrit area would be opened somewhat later. During this time the Third Army could regroup in the South. The map showed Israeli withdrawal to the north and then toward the east with the UN along the ceasefire lines in the northern sector to protect both sides during the regrouping. He concluded by emphasizing that the procedure reflected on the map was open for discussion.]

Elazar:

If you have any reactions now, General, we would be glad to have them and then we could prepare some changes in our approach before our meeting on Sunday.

Gamasi:

First, it seems to me that 28 days are more than enough to complete the redeployment. If we can make it faster, it may help from a psychological viewpoint for our troops. Second, I would like to finish in the south first rather than stretch the process there over 28 days. If we can just make these 28 days faster, it will help. I suggest 15; you suggest 28; perhaps we can make a compromise at 20.

Elazar:

I have no objection in principle. Our problem is a logistical one of evacuating an area where we have quite big forces. The time will depend only on our logistical ability to evacuate. If there is any ability to shorten the time, we will study it. But it is only a logistical problem.

SECRET/NODIS (XGDS)

DECLASSIFIED

Authority *SAL 2958*
By *J* NARA Date *4/10/88*SECRET / NODIS (XGDS)

- 7 -

Gamasi:

About the Suez Road, I am a direct man, a military man. We would like to have a Suez Road open for free movement to the city as soon as possible, even before the start of disengagement. As you know, there has been a promise to this effect.

Elazar:

We know about the promise to open the road in the first 48 hours after the beginning of disengagement. I am afraid that I would not suggest opening the road before that. I don't think both of us should be on the same road at the same time. We want this to be the beginning of cooperation, and if we are both on the road at the same time, there might be some incidents.

Gamasi:

For military movement, I agree. Even if it were open, we would not allow any military movement while your forces are there. But as far as I understand the promise, it is that the road would be open for civilian traffic only in convoys under UN supervision. I would appreciate it if you would think that over. The purpose would be to permit some civilian movement to aid sick people and movement of some officials. There might be only two convoys a day. But the movement would be civilian only and only in convoys to be sure that they were properly controlled. This would be good for the morale of the civilians in the city.

Siilasvuori:

The number of cars in each convoy should be limited too.

Gamasi:

We can discuss this on Sunday.

Elazar:

We will prepare an answer for Sunday.

Gamasi:

We will not bring soldiers out of the Third Army area in civilian clothes because we do not like that idea. I had the impression there was some talk about the civilians because of the political level's interest in the civilians. [Smiling] They are not so interested in the soldiers. We would like especially to get some doctors in because there are some 200 sick civilians. We would only use this for a few days and stop.

SECRET / NODIS (XGDS)

Authority 5012958
By J NARA Date 4/10/88

- 8 -

SECRET/NODIS (XGDS)

Elazar: May I ask about another problem. We are interested in the bodies of our dead soldiers and information about our missing soldiers. We would like to give you the maximum information we know about our missing. Maybe there are some places where they could be searched for. I know that according to the agreement we will get our dead soldiers. We would like, if possible, that you not start to collect them yet since we have religious problems and identification problems. On Sunday we could discuss this problem how to collect their bodies.

Gamasi: All right. I am ready for that. I do not want to raise a prisoner of war issue because I have the answer to that. With regard to the Kabrit point, we would like to treat that group as part of the Third Army for food and supply.

Elazar: [Smiling] There will be no objection. Also, we would like to get a map of sea-mines that you put in the Suez Gulf. One of our ships hit one the other day. We would like to know where there are additional mines so ships can avoid them. Can we get a map?

Gamasi: OK. I'll see.

Elazar: I think this meeting is a good beginning.

Siilasvuo: What shall we tell the press and how shall it be done? Should both parties brief the press or shall I brief them on behalf of both sides?

Elazar: I intend to say a few words to the press later like this: "I believe this agreement has benefits for both sides. It represents a first step toward a better future for these two countries." I don't intend to say anything about winning or about the conditions of this agreement--just its general importance and my belief that both sides will honor it.

Gamasi: I'll say "No comment." General Siilasvuo can say what he likes.

Siilasvuo: Will the text of the agreement be released?

Elazar: I am not going to do it. That will depend on political levels.

SECRET/NODIS (XGDS)

DECLASSIFIED

Authority EW/2958
 By J NARA Date 4/10/88

SECRET

Gamasi:

I agree. That is in the hands of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The War Minister will leave it to the political leaders to take care of that.

Siilasvuo:

We shall conform.

Elazar:

From the UNEF viewpoint, we are interested in the mines and in mine clearing. How will this be done?

Elazar:

This will be quite a problem. We will leave a lot of mines behind.

Siilasvuo:

Are they marked?

Elazar:

They are marked on the maps. There are a few hundreds of thousands of them. In some places there are anti-tank mines and in other places those are combined with anti-personnel mines. We will try to clear as many as we can just to save them, but many will remain.

Gamasi:

General Siilasvuo, if you have maps we will concentrate all of our engineer effort to help solve the problem.

Elazar:

[Smiling] You will get a lot of good American mines.

Siilasvuo:

Should we invite the photographers in?

Gamasi:

I would prefer that we limit the photographers to taking pictures of each delegation as it comes out of the tent.

Siilasvuo:

If General Elazar agrees, that is the way we will proceed. [At this point, coffee and rolls were served. There was some small talk between the Generals across the table. Gamasi jokingly said that he had hoped that perhaps that the two generals would get a trip to Geneva to sign the agreement. General Elazar agreed that that would have been nice, since he needed a rest. Then they both agreed it was better to meet at Kilometer 101.]

H.A.

Harold H. Saunders

SECRET/NODIS (XGDS)

DECLASSIFIED

Authority 5012958
By D NARA Date 4/10/88EGYPTIAN-ISRAELI AGREEMENT ON DISENGAGEMENT OF
FORCES IN PURSUANCE OF THE GENEVA PEACE CONFERENCE

A. Egypt and Israel will scrupulously observe the ceasefire on land, sea, and air, called for by the UN Security Council and will refrain from the time of the signing of this document from all military or para-military actions against each other.

B. The military forces of Egypt and Israel will be separated in accordance with the following principles:

1. All Egyptian forces on the east side of the Canal will be deployed west of the line designated as Line A on the attached map. All Israeli forces, including those west of the Suez Canal and the Bitter Lakes, will be deployed east of the line designated as Line B on the attached map.
2. The area between the Egyptian and Israeli lines will be a zone of disengagement in which the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) will be stationed. The UNEF will continue to consist of units from countries that are not permanent members of the Security Council.
3. The area between the Egyptian line and the Suez Canal will be limited in armament and forces.
4. The area between the Israeli line (Line B on the attached map) and the line designated as Line C

DECLASSIFIED

Authority *501295*
By *D* NARA Date *4/10/88*

- 2 -

on the attached map, which runs along the western base of the mountains where the Gidi and Mitla Passes are located, will be limited in armament and forces.

5. The limitations referred to in paragraphs 3 and 4 will be inspected by UNEF. Existing procedures of the UNEF, including the attaching of Egyptian and Israeli liaison officers to UNEF, will be continued.

6. Air forces of the two sides will be permitted to operate up to their respective lines without interference from the other side.

C. The detailed implementation of the disengagement of forces will be worked out by military representatives of Egypt and Israel, who will agree on the stages of this process. These representatives will meet no later than 48 hours after the signature of this agreement at Kilometer 101 under the aegis of the United Nations for this purpose. They will complete this task within five days. Disengagement will begin within 48 hours after the completion of the work of the military representatives and in no event later than seven days after the signature of this agreement. The process of disengagement will be completed not later than 40 days after it begins.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority 5012958
By D NARA Date 4/10/88

- 3 -

D. This agreement is not regarded by Egypt and Israel as a final peace agreement. It constitutes a first step toward a final, just and durable peace according to the provisions of Security Council Resolution 338 and within the framework of the Geneva Conference.

For Egypt:

Mohammad Abdel Ghani Al-Gamasi, Major General
Chief of Staff of the Egyptian Armed Forces

For Israel:

David Elazar, Lieutenant General
Chief of Staff of the Israel Defence Forces

Witness:


Ennio P. H. Sillasvuo, Lieutenant General
Commander of the United Nations Emergency Force

UNION OF FORCES

DECLASSIFIED

Authority 50/2958

By NARA Date 4/10/88



— "A" LINE

- - - "B" LINE

· · · "C" LINE

— U.N.E.F.