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Authority E.O. 12958

By NS NARA Date 12-13-67

Department of State

TELEGRAM

1974-2-8, Faisal, Nixon, Letter To

O 081325Z ZFF-A  
FM AMEMBASSY JIDDA  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 610R  
BT

SECRET JIDDA 632

NODIS/CHEROKEE

DEPT PASS CAIRO, ALGIERS, DAMASCUS

EMO. 11552: GDS

TAGS: ENRG, PFOR, SA

SUBJECT: KING FAISAL'S RESPONSE TO PRESIDENT NIXON

REF: JIDDA 628; JIDDA 629

1. SUMMARY: KING FAISAL IN A LETTER DATED FEB 7 THANKS EFFORTS TO REACH PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST. HE SAYS HE UNDERSTANDS THE PROBLEMS THE CONTINUED OIL BOYCOTT CAUSES TO AGREE WITH SAUDI ARABIA IN LIFTING THE BOYCOTT. SO FAR, FEW HAVE. HE SAYS THE BOYCOTT RESULTED FROM AN INTER-ARAB DECISION AND WILL HAVE TO BE LIFTED THE SAME WAY. IT HAS BEEN DIFFICULT, HE SAYS, TO CONVINCE OTHER ARABS TO TAKE THIS POSITIVE STEP AS LONG AS THE ISRAELIS HAVE NOT STARTED WITHDRAWAL FROM SYRIA. HE SAYS DISENGAGEMENT IN EGYPT WAS RELATIVELY EASY-- BUT THE WORLD HAS A GREAT INTEREST IN OPENING THE SUEZ CANAL-- FEAR THAT SUFFICIENT PRESSURE WILL NOT BE PLACED ON ISRAEL TO WITHDRAW FROM GOLAN. HE REFERS TO THE RECENT U.S. EFFORTS IN SYRIA AND HOPES THAT THEY ARE SUCCESSFUL; THE SAUDIS ARE NOW AWAITING INFORMATION FROM SYRIA FOR REACTION TO THE PROPOSAL. HE CLOSURES WITH THE REPEATED HOPE THAT DISENGAGEMENT WILL HAVE BEGUN BEFORE THE TRIPOLI MEETING. END SUMMARY.

2. THE TEXT OF THE LETTER DATED FEB. 7, 1974, FOLLOWS: QUOTE: R.E. PRESIDENT RICHARD M. NIXON, PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA. DEAR PRESIDENT: I AM PLEASED TO INFORM YOUR EXCELLENCY THAT I HAVE RECEIVED FROM AMB. AKINS

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EO 12958, as amended, Sect 3.5

NOV 01-34/1987 BY SP-11/11/87 DATE 11/13/87

By SP-11/11/87 Date 11/13/87

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CONTROL: 21890

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

-2-JIDDA 632, FEBRUARY 8, 1974 (NODIS/CHERONEE)

YOUR LETTER DATED FEBRUARY 6, 1974. I FULLY APPRECIATE ALL THE EFFORTS WHICH YOU HAVE BEEN EXERTING FOR THE REALIZATION OF A JUST AND PERMANENT PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST AREA, AND YOUR GOVERNMENT'S COMMITMENT TO A WORK PLAN WHICH WOULD REACH THAT GOAL.

3. WE NOTED WITH GREAT SATISFACTION THAT THIS PLAN HAS BEGUN TO BEAR FRUIT ON THE EGYPTIAN FRONT, AND WE LOOK FORWARD TO THE SAME POSITIVE STEP (OCCURRING) ON THE SYRIAN FRONT, SINCE THIS IS NO LESS IMPORTANT THAN THE EGYPTIAN FRONT, BOTH FRONTS BEING SO INTERLINKED.

4. MR. PRESIDENT: I HAVE AS I HAVE INFORMED YOU STARTED CONTACTS WITH MY ARAB BRETHREN FOR THE LIFTING OF THE OIL BAN ON THE U.S. THIS I DID BECAUSE OF MY COMPLETE APPRECIATION OF THE POSITIVE STEPS TAKEN BY YOUR EXCELLENY FOR ATTAINING A JUST PEACE IN THE AREA, AND BECAUSE OF MY KNOWLEDGE OF THE EMBARRASSING POSITION--ESPECIALLY IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES--THIS WOULD PUT YOU IN INSIDE THE U.S., IF THE BAN IS NOT LIFTED. BUT AS YOU KNOW, OTHER ARABS WOULD NOT REPORT NOT GO ALONG WITH US AND WE ARE ASSOCIATED WITH OUR ARAB BRETHREN IN A RESOLUTION FROM WHICH IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT TO DEVIATE. IT IS DIFFICULT TO CONVINC THEM TO LIFT THE BAN IF NO AGREEMENT IS SIGNED FOR THE DISENGAGEMENT OF FORCES ON THE SYRIAN FRONT. THEIR (THE OTHER ARABS') RATIONALE IN THIS IS THAT ISRAEL AGREED TO THE DISENGAGEMENT OF FORCES ON THE EGYPTIAN FRONT ONLY UNDER WORLD PRESSURE FOR THE OPENING OF THE SUEZ CANAL IN ORDER TO FACILITATE INTERNATIONAL TRANSPORTATION, BUT THAT THE WORLD DOES NOT MUCH CARE ABOUT THE SYRIAN FRONT BECAUSE IT DOESN'T HAVE MUCH INFLUENCE ON ITS COMMERCIAL TRAFFIC. ALSO IN THEIR MINDS IS THE THOUGHT THAT THE SOVIET UNION, ALTHOUGH DESIROUS OF SEEING THE SUEZ CANAL OPEN FOR ITS OWN OBJECTIVES IN THE RED SEA AND FOR BRINGING CLOSER ITS COMMUNICATIONS WITH THE FAR EAST, IS NOT SO ANXIOUS TO HAVE DISENGAGEMENT ON THE GOLAN FRONT. THE SOVIET UNION WOULD LIKE TO SEE THIS FRONT REMAIN A HOT, EXPLOSIVE POINT WHICH WOULD FORCE THE ARABS TO FALL BACK ON THE SOVIET UNION AND CONTINUE TO OPEN THEIR COFFERS TO IT IN RETURN FOR SUPPLYING THEM WITH THE ARMS THEY NEED FOR THEIR SELF-DEFENSE.

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TELEGRAM

-3-JIDDA 632, FEBRUARY 8, 1974 (NODIS/CHEROKEE)

5. MR. PRESIDENT: INITIAL INDICATIONS OF PEACE HAVE BEGUN TO APPEAR ON THE HORIZON OF THE AREA THANKS TO YOUR EFFORTS AND THOSE OF YOUR SECRETARY OF STATE. WE HOPE THAT YOU WILL CONTINUE YOUR EFFORTS TO BRING ABOUT A JUST AND FINAL PEACE IN WHICH THE PEOPLE OF THE AREA CAN ENJOY SECURITY AND STABILITY.
6. WE HAVE GIVEN H.E. THE AMBASSADOR A VERBAL MESSAGE FOR YOUR EXCELLENCE EXPRESSING OUR GREAT CONCERN THAT YOU EXERT YOUR EFFORTS, BEFORE THE CONVENING OF THE ARAB PETROLEUM MINISTERS' CONFERENCE IN TRIPOLI ON FEB 14, 1974, FOR AGREEMENT TO BE REACHED BETWEEN THE TWO SIDES ON THE SYRIAN FRONT, SO THAT OUR STAND AT THE SAID MEETING COULD BE STRONG AND SO THAT WE MIGHT FORESTALL ANY ATTEMPT BY ANY ONE WHO MIGHT DESIRE TO PUT UP OBSTACLES IN THE PATH OF A QUICK SOLUTION.
7. H.E. THE AMBASSADOR CONVEYED TO US AT LENGTH AT HIS MEETING WITH US THE EVENING OF FEB. 6 YOUR EXCELLENCE'S EVALUATIONS, AND HE EXPLAINED FULLY TO US THE EMBARRASSMENT YOU ARE FACING AS A RESULT OF THE DELAY IN LIFTING THE BAN. THE AMBASSADOR ALSO MENTIONED THAT YOU HAD OFFERED SYRIA A PROPOSAL FOR DISENGAGEMENT ON THE GOLAN FRONT, AND ASSURED US OF YOUR DETERMINATION TO CARRY OUT THE TERMS OF THE PROPOSAL, IN THE EVENT THAT SYRIA AGREES TO IT.
8. WE ARE NOW AWAITING SYRIA'S VIEWS ON THIS PROPOSAL SO THAT WE WILL BE ABLE TO CONTACT OUR ARAB BRETHREN IN ORDER TO COORDINATE WITH THEM FURTHER STEPS TO BE TAKEN.
9. WE HOPE THAT YOU WILL EXERT EFFORTS FOR DISENGAGEMENT ON THE SYRIAN FRONT BEFORE THE ARAB OIL MINISTERS' MEETING IS CONVENED SO THAT WE WOULD HAVE A STRONG ARGUMENT TO PUT BEFORE EVERYONE.
10. WE WISH YOUR EXCELLENCE GOOD HEALTH AND SUCCESS. GOD KEEP YOU. FAISAL AL-SAUD. RIYADH. UNQUOTE

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