

Authority *LAC 832806*
By *[Signature]* NARA Date *July*

157 MIL
by (Classification)
SPATCH

DO NOT TYPE IN THIS SPACE

FROM

KHARTOUM

TO

THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON

REF

Khartoum Telegram 12 to Department, November 16, 1954

November 27, 1954

1954-11-27

Az-kari, Naquibi, Dismissd

For Dept Use Only	ACT	REP
	REC	P. OTHER

SUBJECT: **Sudanese Reaction Against Deposition of Neguib**

The HCC decision to depose General Neguib as President of the Egyptian Republic caused resentment and confusion throughout the Sudan. The resentment has lasted longer than most observers anticipated and has assumed political significance. The Sudanese were not surprised at the action itself, as they believed Neguib would have difficulty lasting, but they did not expect the deposition at the time it occurred. Neguib remains the most popular Egyptian to the majority of Sudanese. In fact he is something of a symbol of Egyptian-Sudanese friendship. Even if it were proved that Neguib has been involved in the plot to assassinate General Abdul Nasser, most Sudanese would refuse to believe the proof. Most Sudanese believe that the reason for Neguib's reinstatement to the office of President after his first removal was because of his influence with the Sudanese. Both major political parties in the Sudan are concerned not only about the present deposition of Neguib but any further action involving punishment of him. The SUP, most of whose leaders were out of the Sudan when Neguib was deposed, does not want anything to happen in Egypt which will alienate Sudanese opinion. The SUP high command is aware that the HCC has lost both prestige and respect in the Sudan by ousting Neguib. General Abdul Nasser has not been popular in the Sudan and this action against Neguib which is seen here as a Selah Salim-Gamal Abdul Nasser plot makes Nasser even more unpopular. Furthermore, this easy deposition of the head of state causes many Sudanese to reflect and in not a few cases to state publicly that if a Sudanese were President of a Republic of the Nile Valley, the HCC could depose him as easily as they have ousted Neguib. The Umma Party, which on the basis of the March 1 riots has no real basis for expending the cause of Neguib, nevertheless is making political capital out of his fall. Umma Party leadership have stressed that this action illustrates the irresponsibility and instability of the HCC. Communists have been in the forefront of pro-Neguib demonstrations. The main effect of Neguib's fall, thus far, in the Sudan has been to make full cooperation between Egypt and the Sudan more difficult. Because of its importance, the main steps in the formulation of Sudanese opinion are detailed below:

(1) **Mubarak Zarrong**, Minister of Communications, and Acting Prime Minister told **El Ayem** (pro-independence) when asked for a statement on the event that although he had no official information, "this action will directly affect the sympathetic feelings of the Sudanese people towards the question of the unity

JSwaneyian

OFFICIAL USE ONLY

REPORTER

Authority *14C-83286*
 By *[Signature]*
 NARA Date *3/11/77*

ALL USE (Type
 Classification)

Page _____ of _____
 Incl. No. _____
 Resp. No. _____
 From _____

of the Nile Valley." Naguib Omar, El Ann reporter who queried Zarrang, informed the reporting officer that when he talked to him on the day that Naguib was deposed, Zarrang had not heard the news and was surprised by it.

(2) Sayed Siadik El Naidi, President of the Umm Party, at once issued a public statement stressing that this action should be a lesson to those who favor unity with Egypt.

(3) On the day following Naguib's dismissal the students of the Egyptian secondary school and the Coptic college in Khartoum staged a demonstration in favor of Naguib and against Nasser. The students became so enthusiastic that the police were forced to use tear gas and arrested a few of the leaders.

(4) The initial Communist line on Naguib's fall alleged that the United States was at the bottom of this. Local Communists spread the rumor that Ambassador Caffery was personally responsible and had ordered Naguib dismissed. The United States was pictured in the traditional Communist way as having to get rid of Naguib in order to bolster reaction and dictatorship in Egypt.

(5) The majority of merchants in Khartoum, both Sudanese and expatriates, closed their shops in the late evening hours of November 16 as a protest against Naguib's ousting. This is the first that this action has been taken for any reason in the two years the reporting officer has been in the Sudan.

(6) On November 17, the Dohuran shops closed also as a protest in favor of Naguib and against Nasser. The merchants and others staged a demonstration in the streets, shouting, "Long live Naguib; down with Gamal; Saleh and the revolutionary, military dictatorship of Egypt." The police broke this demonstration up in its early stages and according to police officials if they had allowed this demonstration to go on it could have assumed major proportions.

(7) Floods of cables have gone from Khartoum to Cairo, the Arab League and Saudi Arabia, protesting against the removal of Naguib. A large number of them reportedly expressed concern for his future safety. Many cables were addressed personally to the King of Saudi Arabia and Sayed Ali El Mirghani, requesting them to intervene personally. Throughout the Sudan in the smaller cities, merchants closed their shops in protest.

(8) Rumors circulated that Sayed Ali El Mirghani had obtained a promise from the RCC not to kill Naguib. Some of SAR's Khalifas who told the reporting officer of this insisted that it was true and claimed that they accepted it as true.

(9) The NUP Executive, or that portion of it that was in Khartoum at the time, met on November 17 to consider what it should do as a result of Naguib's fall. A motion authorizing the action of the RCC against Naguib failed after a long discussion. A decision was made and passed by a small majority to send an NUP delegation to Egypt to request the RCC not to harm Naguib.

OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Authority *L.H. 83286*
 By *AMS*
 NARA Date

THIS ONLY

Classification

Page _____ of _____

Vol. No. _____

Resp. No. _____

From _____

This delegation consisted of Mohammed Nur Ed Min, Minister of Public Works, as chairman; Ibrahim El Mufti, Minister of Commerce; El Tayeb Mohammed Ghair, Assistant Secretary General of the NUP, and Khalifa Iahia Osman El Sawaid. The composition of this delegation is extremely interesting in that Mohammed Nur Ed Min is the most pro-Egyptian leader in the NUP. Ibrahim El Mufti and El Tayeb Mohammed Ghair are known as "Egyptian men" and Khalifa Iahia is one of Saleh Salem's chief pay-off agents in the Sudan. The meeting took place when most of the ranking leaders of the party were out of the Sudan. A few Khartoum leaders including Khalafalla Khalid who were in the Sudan did not attend the meeting. The dominant strength in this session of the partial NUP Executive was pro-Egyptian and yet it decided to send a delegation to Cairo to see what it could do about "helping" Meguib.

(10) On November 16, thirty NUP members of Parliament issued a public statement generally criticizing the attitude of the KGB against Meguib.

(11) Mohammed Ahmed El Salamabi, Editor of *Said in Sudan* (organ of the Khartoum) started a series disclosing certain secrets which General Meguib had given him. It will be recalled that Salamabi was dismissed by Saleh Salem as manager of the Egyptian Press Agency in the Sudan (Khartoum Dispatch 65, October 20). Salamabi pointed out that Meguib had asked him not to disclose the secrets until he was dead but in the light of what had happened, Salamabi felt he was free to reveal them. This first article consisted of a long talk with Meguib in which Meguib mentioned Salamabi that he had never had any connection with the Moslem Brotherhood. Furthermore, Meguib allegedly told Salamabi that it had never occurred to him to influence the Brotherhood as he could influence the army to reinstate him in power. Further details of this type were given and the report spread through Khartoum that Saleh Salem had personally appealed to SSM to stop this series.

(12) On November 19, thirty-seven NUP members of Parliament sent the following cable to Gamal Abdel Nasser: "NUP members of both houses of Parliament protest and criticize strongly the decision of the KGB against Meguib. We assure you that such an action, at such a time, is a direct threat to the relations between our two countries. This cable certifies to the anger and displeasure of all the Sudanese people towards this sorrowful and abnormal action."

(13) On November 19, crowds demonstrated after the Friday morning prayers in the Khartoum mosque. They shouted in favor of Meguib and refused to come out of the mosque. A force of police exited outside to arrest any demonstrators who demonstrated on the outside but as none did, this incident ended peacefully.

(14) The editors of all Sudanese papers held a meeting and on November 21 and 22 released their edition to call a mass protest strike to have all papers run headlines criticizing the Egyptian dictatorship; to publish photographs of Meguib on the front page and to send messages of protest to Gamal Abdel Nasser. Of all the newspapers in the three towns, only *El Ibtikad* and *El Ams* (NUP organs) refused to accept these decisions.

OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Authority *146-832896*
By *[Signature]* NARA Dev. *[Signature]*

OFFICIAL USE ONLY
(Classification)

Page _____ of _____
Incl. No. _____
Disp. No. _____
From _____

Comments It is clear from the foregoing that the Sudanese people have been upset by the deprivation of equal, various political interests are working to make the most of this incident. Perhaps the most important development of all is that the Egyptian wing of the NP is using this development to strengthen itself in a bid for an independent Sudan. Many Egyptians believe this incident will force the USSR to re-evaluate its policy towards the Sudan. A disturbing aspect of this pro-Sudan demonstration in the Sudan is that the Communists have used it to strengthen their position.

[Handwritten signature]
Joseph Sweeney
United States Mission Office

cut London, Cairo

OFFICIAL USE ONLY